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CRIMINAL EMPLOYMENT LAW
Benjamin Levin †

This Article diagnoses a phenomenon, “criminal employment law,” which
exists at the nexus of employment law and the criminal justice system. Courts and
legislatures discourage employers from hiring workers with criminal records and
encourage employers to discipline workers for non-work-related criminal
misconduct. In analyzing this phenomenon, my goals are threefold: (1) to examine
how criminal employment law works; (2) to hypothesize why criminal employment
law has proliferated; and (3) to assess what is wrong with criminal employment law.
This Article examines the ways in which the laws that govern the workplace create
incentives for employers not to hire individuals with criminal records and to
discharge employees based on non-workplace criminal misconduct. In this way,
private employers effectively operate as a branch of the criminal legal system. But
private employers act without constitutional or significant structural checks.
Therefore, I argue that the criminal system has altered the nature of employment,
while employment law doctrines have altered the nature of criminal punishment.
Employment law scholars should be concerned about the role of criminal records in
restricting entry into the formal labor market. And criminal law scholars should be
concerned about how employment restrictions extend criminal punishment, shifting
punitive authority and decision-making power to unaccountable private employers.
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INTRODUCTION
The shadow of criminal law looms large over the U.S. labor market.
A criminal record sharply decreases a job applicant’s likelihood of
gaining employment, and employers’ refusal to hire formerly
incarcerated applicants has led to a growing population of unemployed
and underemployed people with criminal records. 1 Every year, more
than 600,000 people are released from prison, but, a year after release,
over seventy-five percent of them remain jobless. 2 While parole boards
treat employment as a powerful guard against recidivism, 3 the legal
system imposes a range of structural obstacles that make it very hard for
people with criminal records to find work.
The difficulty finding and keeping a job thus serves as a significant
collateral consequence of the criminal justice system—a harm that
accompanies criminal conviction, charge, and even arrest. 4 While
1 See, e.g., JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 275–300 (2015); DEVAH
PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION 28–
41 (2007); JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF PRISONER
REENTRY 151–85 (2005).
2 See PAGER, supra note 1, at 5, 28.
3 See id. at 26; JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: PAROLE AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF
THE UNDERCLASS, 1890–1990 192–93 (1993).
4 See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010); Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 593–
94 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
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incarceration, probation, and other formal vehicles of punishment are
explicitly designed to respond to law breaking, these formal sanctions
are only one effect of conviction. As the carceral state has expanded, so
too have civil consequences of conviction—consequences that have
proliferated and grown more severe. 5 Loss of employment opportunities
(along with loss of housing, disenfranchisement, ineligibility for public
benefits, and deportation) may result in greater and longer-lasting
harms than the traditional forms of statutorily or judicially mandated
punishment. 6 These consequences have wreaked havoc in low-income
communities, particularly low-income communities of color. 7 Scholars
have grappled with ways to reduce these collateral costs or ways to make
them more transparent, so that criminal defendants might weigh them
when considering guilty pleas, judges might factor them into sentencing
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 143 (2010); A.B.A., ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF
CONVICTED PERSONS (3d ed. 2004); Margaret Colgate Love, Managing Collateral Consequences
in the Sentencing Process: The Revised Sentencing Articles of the Model Penal Code, 2015 WIS. L.
REV. 247, 249 [hereinafter Managing Collateral Consequences]; Michael Pinard, Collateral
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 457, 459 (2010) [hereinafter Confronting Issues]; Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors
Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277,
299 (2011).
5 See A.B.A., supra note 4, at 8; Kathleen M. Olivares et al., The Collateral Consequences of
a Felony Conviction: A National Study of State Legal Codes 10 Years Later, 60 FED. PROBATION
10, 14–15 (1996) (“[An] analysis of state legal codes reveals an increase between 1986 and 1996
in the extent to which states restrict the rights of convicted felons. . . . [T]here was an increase
in the number of states restricting six rights; voting, holding office, parenting, divorce, firearm
ownership, and criminal registration increased.”); Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between
Collateral and Direct Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of
“Sexually Violent Predators”, 93 MINN. L. REV. 670, 673–74 (2008); Project Description:
National Inventory of Collateral Consequences of Conviction, JUSTICE CTR. [hereinafter
NICCC], http://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/description (last visited Apr. 7, 2018) (“While
collateral consequences have been a familiar feature of the American justice system since
colonial times, they have become more pervasive and more problematic in the past 20 years for
three reasons: they are more numerous and impactfal [sic], they affect more people, and they
are harder to avoid or mitigate. As a result, millions of Americans are consigned to a kind of a
permanent legal limbo because of a crime they committed in the past.”).
6 See generally 21 U.S.C. § 862a (2012) (denying benefits to individuals convicted of certain
drug-related offenses); 42 U.S.C. § 13661 (2012) (restricting housing assistance for those with
drug-related convictions); Harry J. Holzer et al., Will Employers Hire Former Offenders?:
Employer Preferences, Background Checks, and Their Determinants, in IMPRISONING AMERICA:
THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MASS INCARCERATION 205 (Mary Pattillo et al. eds., 2004) (discussing
employment challenges for former offenders); Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An
Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF
MASS IMPRISONMENT 15, 18–25 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (discussing the
ways in which non-criminal statutes bar individuals with criminal records from obtaining a
range of public benefits); Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution,
Representation, and the Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147 (2004)
(describing the process of felon disenfranchisement).
7 See generally JACOBS, supra note 1, at 280–81; PAGER, supra note 1 (showing how
criminal records harm black job applicants more than white applicants); BRUCE WESTERN,
PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 6 (2006).
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determinations, and legislators might act to mitigate their effects.8
However, the role of private employers in this shadow criminal system
remains underexplored.
This Article describes a phenomenon, “criminal employment law,”
which exists at the nexus of employment law and the criminal system.
For those with criminal records, the life-altering effects of their past
run-in(s) with the law shape their legal rights and opportunities in the
labor market. The laws of the workplace empower employers to
discipline workers in response to non-workplace misconduct, and the
tort doctrines of negligent hiring and retention expose employers to
potential liability if they hire people with criminal records. 9 Therefore,
private employers have become critical players in the contemporary
criminal system. 10 But, at the same time, they remain critical sources of
social services—health care, childcare, etc. This Article treats collateral
consequences in the labor market as a window into a troubling and
under-appreciated dynamic in the criminal system: the role of private
actors and institutions in the delivery and design of punishment. 11
My goals are threefold: (1) to examine how criminal employment
8 See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass
Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1825–32 (2012) [hereinafter Chin, The New Civil Death];
Love, supra note 4, at 249; Margaret Colgate Love & Gabriel J. Chin, Old Wine in a New Skin:
The ABA Standards on Collateral Sanctions and Discretionary Disqualification of Convicted
Persons, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 232, 232 (2004); Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the
Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly
Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 686–90 (2006) [hereinafter Pinard, An Integrated
Perspective].
9 See, e.g., El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 479 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2007); Jessica A.
Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2, 76–85 (2015); Elizabeth A. Gerlach, The
Background Check Balancing Act: Protecting Applicants with Criminal Convictions While
Encouraging Criminal Background Checks in Hiring, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 981, 988 (2006).
10 By stressing the fluid boundaries of the criminal system, this Article contributes to a
growing literature that questions whether the administration of criminal law constitutes a
“system” at all. See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, The Influence of Systems Analysis on Criminal
Law and Procedure: A Critique of a Style of Judicial Decision-Making (Columbia Pub. Law
Research, Paper No. 14-562, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3062900 (tracing the use of “criminal justice system” as a concept in legal and social thought);
Sara Mayeux, The Idea of the “Criminal Justice System”, AM. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3050263 (same); John F. Pfaff, Waylaid by
a Metaphor: A Deeply Problematic Account of Prison Growth, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1087, 1089
(2013).
11 While sociologists have studied empirically the problems of reentry into the labor market
for those with criminal records, see, e.g., Holzer, supra note 6; PAGER, supra note 1, and while
others have begun to address the legal framework for discrimination against ex-offenders in the
labor market, see, e.g., Leroy D. Clark, A Civil Rights Task: Removing Barriers to Employment of
Ex-Convicts, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 193, 196–97 (2004), the relationship between employment
consequences and employment law has gone largely unexplored and un-critiqued. Cf. NOAH
ZATZ ET AL., UCLA INST. FOR RESEARCH ON LABOR & EMP’T, GET TO WORK OR GO TO JAIL:
WORKPLACE RIGHTS UNDER THREAT (Mar. 2016), http://www.labor.ucla.edu/publication/getto-work-or-go-to-jail (examining terms of release that are premised on the ability to retain
employment).
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law works; (2) to hypothesize why criminal employment law has
proliferated; and (3) to assess what is wrong with criminal employment
law. This Article examines the ways in which the laws that govern the
workplace encourage employers to reject job applicants with criminal
records and to discharge employees based on non-workplace
misconduct. I argue that through these legal mechanisms private
employers effectively operate as a branch of the criminal system without
constitutional or significant structural checks. Therefore, this Article
argues that the criminal system has altered the nature of employment,
while employment law doctrines have altered the nature of criminal
punishment.
Criminal law’s collateral consequences in the employment sphere
should be cause for concern for many of the reasons collateral
consequences in general are cause for concern (including that they
operate as “invisible” punishment). 12 But the collateral consequences in
the employment sphere raise an additional set of concerns because they
ostensibly arise outside of the criminal system and often depend on the
decisions, preferences, and incentives of private actors. By focusing on
private employers and their public function in extending the effects of
punishment, I argue that criminal employment law illustrates structural
flaws with both the criminal system and the legal status of employment.
Employment and labor law scholars should be concerned about the
shadow economy of those who are unwelcome in the formal labor
market as a result of past criminal convictions (or even arrests). 13 By
tying employer liability to criminal records, the legal system invites (and
often requires) employers to monitor their employees’ behavior away
from work. At the same time, criminal law scholars should consider
how employment restrictions might serve as extensions of criminal
punishment and how the involvement of private employers might
complicate discussions of criminal justice reform. If private
employment provides the vehicle through which workers access critical
benefits, then public functions of the welfare state are necessarily filtered
through the actions, decisions, and preferences of private employers.
Employers’ role as disciplining force is reflected not only in the tort
law doctrines of negligent hiring and retention, 14 but also in the public
12 See Travis, supra note 6, at 15–16; see also Love & Chin, supra note 8, at 232 (“One goal
of the new [ABA] Standards [on collateral consequences] is to encourage awareness of the full
legal consequences of a criminal conviction, particularly those that are mandatory upon
conviction. There is no justification for the legal system to operate in ignorance of the effects of
its actions.”).
13 I distinguish between punishment and arrest here, but it is worth noting that many of the
consequences of formal criminal punishment also attach at the arrest stage, substantially
widening the pool of those drawn into the criminal system’s ambit. See generally Eisha Jain,
Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2015).
14 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1965); Stacy A.
Hickox, Employer Liability for Negligent Hiring of Ex-Offenders, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1001, 1006
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demand for and proliferation of employee conduct policies that put
employers in a position to punish workers for non-work-related
criminal misconduct. 15 Such doctrines and policies may be appealing—
we as a society may want employers to assume this role as a cost of
doing business and to be responsible for the conduct of their employees.
But this Article will consider the effects of such a legal framework. My
claim is not that employers should never be permitted to consider a job
applicant’s or employee’s allegedly criminal conduct. Rather, my goal is
to assess how those consequences operate and to confront the costs of
employer decision-making as an extension of criminal punishment. To
the extent that involvement with the criminal system is creating or
preserving a racial and socioeconomic underclass, 16 it is important to
ask how the classifications operate in practice. If employers effectively
operate as an arm of the criminal system, do criminal procedure
principles have a place in the employment law pantheon? And to the
extent that such an application would be inappropriate, should we also
be skeptical about delegating criminal justice–related tasks to employers
in the first place?
In an effort to address these questions, this Article will proceed in
four Parts. The Article will first ask how and why criminal employment
law has proliferated, before turning to the costs of criminal employment
law. Part I will describe how criminal employment law fits into the
broader scholarly discussion of collateral consequences. Next, Part II
will examine how criminal employment law operates and will provide
an overview of its legal architecture and justifications. This Part will
focus on two areas of law that shape employer incentives and regulate
the employment relationship: (1) the tort doctrines of negligent hiring
and negligent retention and (2) personnel or employee conduct policies
(2011) (collecting cases).
15 See, e.g., Janine Young Kim & Matthew J. Parlow, Off-Court Misbehavior: Sports Leagues
and Private Punishment, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 573, 575–79 (2009); Bethany P.
Withers, The Integrity of the Game: Professional Athletes and Domestic Violence, 1 HARV. J.
SPORTS & ENT. L. 145, 150 (2010); Note, Out of Bounds: Professional Sports Leagues and
Domestic Violence, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1048, 1049 (1996); David Post, Justice, Ferguson MO, and
the NFL, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/12/05/justice-ferguson-mo-and-the-nfl.
16 See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 4 (arguing that the criminal system has created a
socially, politically, and legally marginalized class of black men); James Forman, Jr., Why Care
About Mass Incarceration?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 993, 1003 (2010) (arguing that aggressive
policing of low-income communities of color “told students that no matter what they do, their
race, poverty, and political powerlessness will always mark them as outlaws, available for
degradation whenever the state chooses”); Michael Pinard, Criminal Records, Race and
Redemption, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 963, 969 (2013) (“As a result, poor individuals of
color disproportionately bear the mark of a criminal record. This is perhaps the heaviest
possible burden to carry, as the effects of a criminal record are long-lasting and often
permanent. For those who are convicted, these effects include the essentially countless legal
disabilities—termed collateral consequences . . . .”).
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that provide for employee discharge or discipline based on non-workrelated interactions with the criminal system. While these two legal
areas are distinct and implicate the criminal system in different ways,
they both allow for employers to advance or exacerbate the punitive
effect of underlying state action (e.g., arrest, conviction, etc.).
Next, Part III will examine further the justifications for criminal
employment law by (1) situating it within the literature on the collateral
consequences of conviction and (2) considering the limitations of
possible policy solutions. This Part will survey briefly a set of policy
responses that courts or legislators might adopt to check the impact of
tort liability and conduct policies on the work-lives of individuals with
criminal records. I will look to policy proposals aimed at reducing
employment consequences for the previously incarcerated: (1)
modification of the negligent hiring/retention tort doctrines; (2) “ban
the box” laws that restrict employers from considering criminal history
in hiring decisions 17; (3) traditional employment discrimination
principles; (4) contractual solutions to employers’ private conduct
policies; and (5) integration of employment considerations into
sentencing determinations. I will describe the potential benefits of each
solution, but by emphasizing the persistent problems associated with the
role of private employers in the criminal punishment (and even
rehabilitative) enterprise, I also will note the ways in which each might
fall short.
Part IV will turn to the costs of criminal employment law by asking
what is wrong with this legal regime. This Part will continue the focus
on the status of criminal employment law as a public/private and
civil/criminal hybrid. To the extent that relaxing the state action
doctrine and extending procedural protections to private employers are
unpalatable or problematic solutions, this Article will ask why. Or,
perhaps more importantly, if constitutional criminal procedure
principles do not have a role to play in the workplace, why should
private employers be asked to, expected to, or allowed to operate as
disciplinary institutions tasked with punishing worker malfeasance that
does not affect the workplace? By exploring the answer to this question,
I hope to examine the costs of the hybrid public/private approach to
employment law and the significant social costs of encouraging private
actors to further punitive ends.
Ultimately, I will argue that criminal employment law has a lot to
tell us about both the structure of criminal punishment and the nature
of employment. I highlight how employment law doctrines and
employment consequences shape and are shaped by the criminal system
17 See generally Johnathan J. Smith, Banning the Box but Keeping the Discrimination?:
Disparate Impact and Employers’ Overreliance on Criminal Background Checks, 49 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 197, 211–15 (2014) (describing the “ban the box” movement and its goals).
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and how a comprehensive reform movement must engage with these
ostensibly disparate legal areas and grapple with the pathologies and
power dynamics of the employment relationship.
I. THE CONTEXT OF CRIMINAL EMPLOYMENT LAW
In some sense, criminal employment law operates as a
quintessential collateral consequence of criminal punishment. 18 An
individual is convicted, arrested, charged, or subject to some state
action, and, as a result, she faces a new set of challenges not specifically
identified by the sentencing judge, arresting officer, or relevant law
enforcement personnel. 19
But my treatment of criminal employment law differs from most
scholarly accounts of collateral consequences. The growing literature on
collateral consequences (including employment consequences)
generally treats these effects as a public law problem. 20 That is, scholars
and advocates have trained their fire on formal collateral
consequences—statutes that explicitly restrict the rights of individuals
with criminal records.
For example, in its 2003 Model Standards on the “Collateral
Sanctions and Discretionary Disqualification of Convicted Persons,” the
American Bar Association (ABA) Task Force on Collateral Sanctions
and Discretionary Disqualification of Convicted Persons laid out a
comprehensive proposal to address the growing web of collateral
consequences. 21 While the Standards distinguish between “collateral
sanction[s]” (consequences that attach automatically) and
“discretionary disqualification[s]” (consequences that the state is
“authorized but not required to impose on a person convicted of an
offense on grounds related to the conviction”), they only address state
action. 22 That is, the Standards focus on how state actors make
18 See A.B.A., supra note 4, at 7–9; Chin, The New Civil Death, supra note 8, at 1791;
Roberts, supra note 5, at 673.
19 See Gilchrist v. Bd. of Review, 94 P.3d 72, 77 n.5 (Okla. 2004); Pinard, An Integrated
Perspective, supra note 8, at 635–36.
20 See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret Love, Status as Punishment: A Critical Guide to
Padilla v. Kentucky, 25 CRIM. JUST. 21, 26 (2010); Nora V. Demleitner, “Collateral Damage”: No
Re-Entry for Drug Offenders, 47 VILL. L. REV. 1027 (2002); Sandra J. Mullings, Employment of
Ex-Offenders: The Time Has Come for a True Antidiscrimination Statute, 64 SYRACUSE L. REV.
261, 295 (2014); David Wolitz, The Stigma of Conviction: Coram Nobis, Civil Disabilities, and
the Right to Clear One’s Name, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1277, 1312–13 (“The most tangible of the
non-legal consequences of conviction is the loss of employment prospects.”).
21 See A.B.A., supra note 4, at 8–13. The Report does, however, use “collateral
consequences” as a general descriptive term. For purposes of clarity and simplicity (and in
keeping with most scholarly literature in the area), this Article will refer to “collateral
consequences” rather than the two subcategories defined by the ABA.
22 Id. § 19-1.1.
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decisions, but they have little to say about consequences shaped by
private actors and “private law.” 23
Addressing these formal collateral consequences certainly is critical
to understanding and reforming the realities of the criminal system. But
these consequences are only part of a bigger picture. By focusing
exclusively on statutes and state actors, the Standards—and much
collateral consequences scholarship—understate the role of private
actors and attendant common law and private social regimes. 24
This Article departs from the Standards’ approach in order to
address “informal” collateral consequences. “Unlike formal collateral
consequences, such as loss of public housing eligibility, deportation,
occupational disqualification, or electoral disenfranchisement,” Wayne
Logan explains, “informal” consequences “do not attach by express
operation of law.” 25 Informal collateral consequences “aris[e]
independently of specific legal authority, and concern the gamut of
negative social, economic, medical, and psychological consequences of
conviction.”26 In introducing this distinction, Logan has argued that
legal scholars’ important work on collateral consequences has
undervalued the significance of these informal consequences. 27
This Article’s focus on the role of private employers in the criminal
system is intended to respond to Logan. In examining criminal
employment law, this Article takes up and continues the larger project
of considering the informal collateral consequences and the legal and
social conditions that shape them. The institutions of criminal
employment law that I address depend on the conduct of private
employers and a range of (at least ostensibly) private social orderings,
rather than statutory diktats. 28 While the employment decisions and
23 See generally John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 1640, 1640–41 (2012) (opposing the legal realist position that all law is public, and
defining “private law” as “includ[ing] the common law subjects that have long been central to
U.S. legal education–contracts, property, and torts”). While this Article challenges the
public/private distinction and therefore relies on a realist account of the way in which the law
functions, I use “private law” and “public law” as descriptive phrases in much the same way as
Goldberg does.
24 Indeed, taking “criminal justice” and “criminal justice reform” seriously should require
us to appreciate the ways in which the criminal system affects and is affected by legal doctrines
and institutions that appear far removed from the traditional realms of substantive and
procedural criminal law. See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff, Introduction:
Mapping the New Criminal Justice Thinking, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 1
(Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017); Benjamin Levin, Book Review, Rethinking
the Boundaries of ‘Criminal Justice’, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 619 (2018).
25 See Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1104
(2013).
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 As noted in Part II, there certainly are employment-related collateral consequences that
would fall into the “collateral sanctions” category, as they rest on statutory bans on licensing,
employment, etc. See JACOBS, supra note 1, at 261–62 (collecting statutes).
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legal regimes outlined in this Article may be responsive to statutory,
common-law, or consumerist pressures, they hardly fall into the ABA
Standards’ framework. Instead they rest on an even more opaque set of
decisions and decision-makers. 29
I do not mean to undersell the important work that other collateral
consequences scholarship and the ABA taskforce have done in bringing
“invisible punishment” to the fore and deconstructing the
direct/collateral distinction. This distinction has been critiqued rightly
as “formalistic,” “outdated,” and “unprincipled. 30 Indeed, dating at least
to the 1950s, criminal law practitioners and scholars have attempted to
catalog and curb collateral consequences. 31 Drafted in 1962, decades
before the rise of scholarly attention to collateral consequences, section
306.6 of the Model Penal Code explicitly addressed the need to confront
these harms by granting the sentencing court the authority to enter an
order eliminating “any disqualification or disability imposed by law
because of the conviction . . . .” 32 While this provision of the Model
Penal Code has failed to gain acceptance, recent work is a big step in the
right direction.
That being said, the exclusive focus on “formal” collateral
consequences understates the scope of the problem faced by individuals
with criminal records. Further, by failing to address informal collateral
consequences, the current discourse invites policy solutions that fail to
remedy much discrimination against those with criminal records. 33
Therefore, this Article argues that criminal employment law—a class of
“informal” collateral consequences—requires the same attention as
mandatory or “formal” collateral consequences.
My claim is that criminal employment law mirrors the same
patterns as formal collateral consequences and risks producing similar
effects. Certainly, as a descriptive matter there is a difference between a
consequence that attaches automatically or via state action and one that
does not—the latter necessarily implicates the discretion of private
actors and, as a result, is less predictable. 34 That is, informal collateral
29 See Eisha Jain, Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104 GEO. L.J. 1197, 1241 (2016);
Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1317 (2012) (“More broadly,
misdemeanor processing reveals the deep structure of the criminal system: as a pyramid that
functions relatively transparently and according to legal principle at the top, but in an opaque
and unprincipled way for the vast majority of cases at the bottom.”).
30 Roberts, supra note 5, at 672–73.
31 See JACOBS, supra note 1, at 248; Margaret Colgate Love, Starting over with a Clean Slate:
In Praise of a Forgotten Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1709
(2003) [hereinafter Love, Starting over].
32 Model Penal Code § 306.6(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1962). But the shift from a rehabilitative to
a punitive approach to criminal justice in the following decades saw a move to eliminate “civil
death” after a conviction largely forgotten. See Love, Starting over, supra note 31, at 1713–16.
33 See generally infra Part III.
34 It is worth noting that, given empirical research on employers’ hiring preferences, it
would not be unreasonable to conclude that difficulty in finding employment post-conviction is
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consequences like criminal employment law are even collateral to the
consequences treated as collateral consequences by legal scholars. But, if
these private decisions have similar effects, why should this formal
distinction matter? If discretion is routinely exercised in the same way,
then we should be able to predict its consequence. Criminologists Devah
Pager, Bruce Western, and others have shown that employers generally
would prefer to hire job applicants without criminal records. 35 So, even
if the employment consequences are contingent on the decisions or
policies of private actors, it appears that the effects are at least somewhat
predictable. 36
highly probable. See HARRY J. HOLZER, WHAT EMPLOYERS WANT: JOB PROSPECTS FOR LESSEDUCATED WORKERS 59–60 (1996); JACOBS, supra note 1, at 279–82 (collecting data on
employer hiring preferences); Ian B. Petersen, Toward True Fair-Chance Hiring: Balancing
Stakeholder Interests and Reality in Regulating Criminal Background Checks, 94 TEX. L. REV.
175, 176–77 (2015); Joan Petersilia, When Prisoners Return to the Community: Political,
Economic, and Social Consequences 1, 3–4 (Sentencing & Corr. Issues for the 21st Century, No.
9, 2000). That being said, as I stress throughout the Article, private employers and their
decisions operate as intervening acts and actors in the chain of causation from conviction to
unemployment.
35 See, e.g., PAGER, supra note 1, at 59–63; Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect
Class: Towards a Constitutional Framework for Evaluating Occupational Restrictions Affecting
People with Criminal Records, 7 J.L. SOC’Y 18, 22–23 (2005) (“For example, one study
conducted in five major cities showed that two-thirds of employers would not knowingly hire a
former offender.”); Petersen, supra note 34, at 176–78 (“Employers said they were less likely to
hire ex-offenders than any other disadvantaged population included in the survey: welfare
recipients (82% willing to hire), GED holders (82%), applicants who had been unemployed for
at least one year (68%), and even applicants with only part- or short-time work experience
(48%).”).
36 Indeed, predicting the behavior of private employers is hardly unheard of in public law.
By way of analogy, in the Social Security context, administrative law judges (ALJs) frequently
rely on the testimony of “vocational experts.” See, e.g., Banks v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 449, 454
(7th Cir. 2006); Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004); Jon C. Dubin,
Overcoming Gridlock: Campbell After a Quarter-Century and Bureaucratically Rational GapFilling in Mass Justice Adjudication in the Social Security Administration’s Disability Programs,
62 ADMIN. L. REV. 937, 964–65 (2010). These experts testify as to a disability claimant’s ability
to perform various jobs and the presence of those jobs in the labor market. See, e.g., Boone v.
Barnhart, 353 F.3d 203, 205–06 (3d Cir. 2003); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1100–01 (9th
Cir. 1999). Whether a claimant receives benefits often depends upon the testimony of the
vocational expert and her statements about the claimant’s likelihood of being hired by a private
employer. See, e.g., Smith v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 378 (6th Cir. 2001); Dubin, supra at 964–65.
There are many reasons to be suspicious about ALJs’ reliance on vocational expert testimony.
See Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 2002) (“We asked the parties at oral
argument what makes a vocational expert an ‘expert’ (and where the information in the
Dictionary [of Occupational Titles] came from). They did not know.”); Dubin, supra at 966–68
(listing problems and noting the “‘emperor’s new clothing’ quality sometimes attendant to
[vocational expert] qualifications and evidence”). But it is worth noting that this practice of
examining the private labor market is a staple of the large body of litigation that comprises
Social Security appeals. ALJs’ decisions and the allocation of benefits depend not on extensive
social scientific research or legislative fact finding, but on the statements of marginally qualified
experts. See generally Nathaniel O. Hubley, Note, The Untouchables: Why a Vocational Expert’s
Testimony in Social Security Disability Hearings Cannot Be Touched, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 353
(2008) (critiquing the overreliance on testimony from vocational experts). That is, if such vague
statements about the labor market provide a sufficient basis to grant or deny federal benefits,
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If we know that a criminal conviction is likely to render an
individual unemployable, and if we know that a range of economic
benefits and social and civil rights are tied to employment, then we
should be able to identify a set of collateral consequences that are highly
likely to result from conviction. While the consequences may not be
mandatory and while they might rest on private decision-makers, they
are foreseeable. Thus, to the extent that scholars have argued that formal
collateral consequences should be factored into decisions about
punishment or sentencing, I argue that informal collateral consequences
also should be. As the Standards indicate, scholars and attorneys have
identified a set of tools and institutional reforms that might take
collateral consequences seriously. 37 It is impossible to assess whether
sentences are too harsh, too lenient, etc. if we do not know the
parameters of each sentence. 38 Probable unemployment, coupled with
the attendant social and economic problems, might appear
disproportionate when coupled with lengthy prison sentences or other
direct effects of conviction (or, in some cases, perhaps not). To the
extent formal punishment plus informal collateral consequences appear
disproportionate, they should trigger the sorts of policy proposals and
inspection that the Standards put forth and scholars of collateral
consequences have raised.
Even if criminal employment law were not troubling as excessively
punitive, though, it still would raise predictability concerns. That is, the
contingency of criminal employment law in and of itself should be an
issue. An enormous amount of case law and scholarly literature has
focused on the role of discretion in sentencing (whether it is properly
exercised by the judge, the legislator, or the prosecutor; whether
determinate sentencing schemes yield fairer outcomes; whether
discretion helps or hurts defendants of color and other marginalized
groups). 39 Regardless of our view on the proper function of discretion in
then why could not engagement with data about private market actors have a role to play at
sentencing or in the course of determining probation terms or terms of release?
37 See generally A.B.A., supra note 4.
38 Of course, properly calibrating sentences or punishments would also require a broader
agreement on the purposes of punishment and what functions criminal law is meant to serve.
See generally Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 117 MICH. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2018) (examining competing theories of criminal justice reform and the
significance of first-principles disagreements). Cf. JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE
CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 8 (2017) (noting that
“no one has provided a metric for determining how many people in prison is ‘too many’”).
Such a discussion of criminal punishment’s proper purpose falls outside the scope of this
Article.
39 See, e.g., Shima Baradaran, Race, Prediction, and Discretion, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 157,
171 (2013); Robert Heller, Selective Prosecution and the Federalization of Criminal Law: The
Need for Meaningful Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1326–
27 (1997); Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1413,
1414–15 (2010); Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial
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determining punishment, it is important to note that private
employment consequences shift decisions about the treatment of
individuals with criminal convictions outside of the scope of the
criminal system altogether. 40 Given that the criminal code is a product
of political decisions by political actors, someone will always be
exercising some degree of discretion in shaping criminal punishment.
Should that someone be a private employer?
Put simply, the conventional treatment of formal collateral
consequences understates the role that private actors and informal
consequences play in shaping the lives of individuals with criminal
records. By focusing on private employers and non-statutory legal
frameworks, I hope to shine a light on the private decisions and legal
doctrines that shape the experience of punishment. To this end, the next
Part lays out the legal framework of “criminal employment law.”
II. THE FRAMEWORK OF CRIMINAL EMPLOYMENT LAW
A wide array of legal and extra-legal institutions shapes the
interaction between the criminal system and the labor market. For
individuals arrested, charged, or sentenced, a web of statutes will affect
their attempts to obtain or retain employment. 41 Licensing laws in many
states bar those convicted of crimes from a range of occupations, 42 and
seven states go so far as to forbid those convicted of a felony from
holding any public jobs. 43 According to the National Inventory of
Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851 (1995); Jed S.
Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014), http://
www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty.
40 See infra Section IV.B.
41 See JACOBS, supra note 1, at 261; Debbie A. Mukamal & Paul N. Samuels, Statutory
Limitations on Civil Rights of People with Criminal Records, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1501, 1503–
05 (2003) (describing statutes that specifically address those with arrests rather than
convictions).
42 See Bruce E. May, The Character Component of Occupational Licensing Laws: A
Continuing Barrier to the Ex-Felon’s Employment Opportunities, 71 N.D. L. Rev. 187, 209–10
(1995). For example, in New York, a person convicted of any felony may not work in real estate
sales, see N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 440-a (McKinney 2018), alcohol sales, see N.Y. ALCO. BEV.
CONT. LAW § 110(d) (McKinney 2018), check cashing, see N.Y. BANKING LAW § 369(6)
(McKinney 2018), as a firefighter, see N.Y.C., N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 15-103 (2018), a notary, see
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 130 (McKinney 2018), a pier superintendent or hiring agent, see N.Y.
UNCONSOL. LAW § 9814(b) (McKinney 2018), a private investigator, N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 74
(McKinney 2018), an insurance adjuster, see N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 2108(d)(3)–(4) (McKinney
2018). See generally LEGAL ACTION CTR., NEW YORK STATE OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING SURVEY
(2006), http://lac.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Occupational-Licensing-Survey-2006.pdf.
43 JACOBS, supra note 1, at 261. Other states forbid public employment for individuals with
felony convictions, but allow for “restoration of eligibility.” Id. Even states that do not contain
blanket prohibitions on public employment still restrict heavily the employment of those with
criminal records. See id. Indeed, it is not uncommon for state law to include hundreds of
statutes and regulations granting public employers the discretion to discharge individuals with
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Collateral Consequences of Conviction (NICCC) maintained by the
ABA, 599 federal statutes and regulations restrict employment for those
with criminal records. 44 As of March 2016, eighty-five percent of all the
statutes and regulations in the NICCC (state and federal) pertain to the
employment rights of those with criminal records. 45 Indeed, looking to
the employment-related statutes in the broader context of other denials
of rights and benefits, 46 it would be hard to disagree with James Jacobs’s
characterization of those with criminal records as “second-class citizens
by law.” 47
Statutory criminal employment law—the web of laws that governs
public employment and public licensing—is ubiquitous. 48 But, in this
Part, and in this Article generally, I do not want to focus on the
statutory schemes. These statutes are certainly important. They shape
the circumstances of reentry and the broad sweep of the criminal
system. But, while they are hidden punishments, unmentioned at
sentencing and not written into the criminal laws that define offenses or
prescribe punishment, they are still more visible than another corner of
criminal employment law: ostensibly, private “private law” 49 doctrines
of employer liability for employee conduct and employer disciplinary
systems. These non-statutory institutions play a critical role in the
broader framework of criminal employment law. 50 The use of criminal
background checks as a prerequisite to employment has expanded
criminal records or banning outright individuals with criminal records from holding specific
jobs. See Search by Jurisdiction, JUSTICE CTR., https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/search/?
jurisdiction (select “Employment” from “Category”) (last visited May. 23, 2018). The numbers
range from greater than federal restrictions (California has 753) to more modest, but still large
numbers (Rhode Island has 189). Id. (click “Advanced Search”; select “Employment” from
“Categories”; select the state from “Jurisdiction”)
44 Search by Jurisdiction, supra note 43 (select “Employment” from Category and select
“Federal” from “Jurisdiction”). Of these 599, 242 are “mandatory” or “automatic.” Id. That is, a
conviction immediately triggers discharge, failure to hire, or reporting to a superior, rather than
granting a supervising or hiring official the discretion to make an employment decision.
45 See id.
46 See, e.g., John Bronsteen et al., Happiness and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1063–
64 (2009); Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on
Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153 (1999); Michael Pinard &
Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal
Convictions: An Introduction, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 585 (2006); Anthony C.
Thompson, Navigating the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-Offender Reentry, 45 B.C. L. REV. 255, 279–
82 (2004) (“Although it is tempting to think in isolation about each of the problems reentering
ex-offenders face, they tend to be linked.”).
47 JACOBS, supra note 1, at 249.
48 See, e.g., JACOBS, supra note 1, at 261; Mukamal & Samuels, supra note 41; NICCC, supra
note 5.
49 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
50 See generally MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & MAURICE EMSELLEM, THE NAT’L EMP.
LAW PROJECT, 65 MILLION “NEED NOT APPLY”: THE CASE FOR REFORMING CRIMINAL
BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT (Mar. 2011), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/
2015/03/65_Million_Need_Not_Apply.pdf (cataloging the effects of employment
discrimination against those with criminal records).
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substantially in the last twenty years, 51 and surveys have shown that over
sixty percent of employers would not knowingly hire people with
criminal records. 52 This means that much of the work of criminal
employment law operates extra-statutorily.
There may be legitimate reasons why employers are hesitant to hire
those with criminal records. But it does not follow that any conviction
should bar any type of employment, or that the law, employers, or
consumers are necessarily justified in imposing blanket bans. Further,
this Article emphasizes that those decisions and those preferences have
significant social and distributional costs. To the extent that they
disadvantage certain groups, have criminogenic effects, or are
undervalued in calibrating punishment, they require our attention.
As sociologist Bruce Western describes it, the treatment of
individuals with criminal records, particularly black men, has resulted in
a process of “social exclusion.” 53 This marginalized population “bears
the stigma of official criminality in all subsequent spheres of social life,
as citizens, workers, and spouses.” 54 According to Western and other
scholars of reentry, the marginalization is inextricably linked to
employment and to the labor market—mass incarceration removes
many people from the labor market directly (via imprisonment) and
indirectly (via the collateral consequences that follow release). 55 “[P]enal
exclusion has been layered on top of economic and racial exclusion,”
argues David Garland, “ensuring that social divisions are deepened, and
that a criminalized underclass is brought into existence and
systematically perpetuated.” 56 That is, the carceral state and the effects of
51 See Ian B. Petersen, Note, Toward True Fair-Chance Hiring: Balancing Stakeholder
Interests and Reality in Regulating Criminal Background Checks, 94 TEX. L. REV. 175, 177 (2015)
(“In 1994, just 48% of surveyed Los Angeles employers always or sometimes checked criminal
backgrounds; by 2001, this number had risen to 63%. A 2010 national survey showed over 90%
of employers used criminal background checks in some capacity, and 73% used them for all
candidates.” (footnote omitted)).
52 See PAGER, supra note 1, at 34.
53 WESTERN, supra note 7, at 6. See generally JACOBS, supra note 1, at 279–81 (reporting on
studies that demonstrate that black job applicants with criminal records are less likely to find
employment than similarly situated white applicants); PAGER, supra note 1 (same). But see
Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and Statistical Discrimination: A
Field Experiment (U. of Mich. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 16-012,
2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2795795 (finding no relationship
between race and felony convictions in hiring decisions).
54 WESTERN, supra note 7, at 6.
55 See id. (“So marginal have these men become, that the most disadvantaged among them
are hidden from statistics on wages and employment. The economic situation of young black
men—measured by wage and employment rates—appeared to improve through the economic
expansion of the 1990s, but this appearance was wholly an artifact of rising incarceration
rates.”).
56 David Garland, Introduction: The Meaning of Mass Imprisonment, in MASS
IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 1, 2 (David Garland ed., 2001); see also
Jonathan Simon & Richard Sparks, Punishment and Society: The Emergence of an Academic
Field, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF PUNISHMENT AND SOCIETY 1, 11 (Jonathan Simon &
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mass incarceration are embedded in a broader set of economic
conditions.
In this Part, and in this Article generally, I will focus on the
decisions made by employers and the common law doctrines and
private agreements that structure those decisions in an effort to examine
the legal architecture of this social and economic exclusion. Specifically,
this Part first will examine the tort law doctrines of negligent hiring and
retention, which allow for liability when employers hire or retain
individuals with criminal records. Next, this Part will discuss the rise of
employee conduct policies that allow for employers to discipline or
discharge employees based on criminal investigations, arrests, or
charges.
A.

Negligent Hiring and Retention

In order to understand the place of “private law” in the criminal
system, it is important to recognize tort law’s role in bringing criminal
records into the workplace. The doctrines of negligent hiring and
retention create potentially broad avenues for direct employer liability
based on the identity and history of employees. 57 “These theories of
recovery impose liability for an employee’s intentional tort, an action
almost invariably outside the scope of employment,” 58 but they do so
because of an overarching attempt to “address risks created by exposing
members of the public to a potentially dangerous individual.” 59
Both doctrines rest on the premise that an employer may be
responsible for the misconduct of her employee even when the
employee acts outside the scope of her employment. An employer “is
under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his [employee]
while acting outside the scope of his employment as to prevent him
from intentionally harming others or from so conducting himself as to
create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them” if the conduct
satisfies four elements—the employee: (1) “is upon the premises in
possession of the [employer] or upon which the [employee] is privileged
to enter only as his [employee],” or (2) “is using a chattel of the master,”
and the employer: (3) “knows or has reason to know that he has the
ability to control his [employee],” and (4) “knows or should know of the
necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.” 60 Specifically, in
Richard Sparks eds., 2013) (describing this view of incarceration as social control).
57 See, e.g., Connes v. Molalla Transp. Sys., 831 P.2d 1316, 1320–21 (Colo. 1992); Plains
Res., Inc. v. Gable, 682 P.2d 653, 662 (Kan. 1984); Di Cosala v. Kay, 450 A.2d 508, 515 (N.J.
1982).
58 Yunker v. Honeywell, Inc., 496 N.W.2d 419, 422 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
59 Id. (citing Di Cosala, 450 A.2d at 515).
60 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also Ehrens v.
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the context of negligent retention, an employer may be liable for
“retaining in his employment [employees] who, to his knowledge, are in
the habit of misconducting themselves in a manner dangerous to others.
This is true although he has without success made every other effort to
prevent their misconduct by the exercise of his authority as
[employer].” 61
In negligent hiring and retention cases, therefore, courts focus on
the “propensities” of the employees. 62 For this reason, the doctrines
remain distinct from general principles of respondeat superior. 63 As the
Supreme Court of New Jersey has explained:
[T]he tort of negligent hiring addresses the risk created by exposing
members of the public to a potentially dangerous individual, while
the doctrine of respondeat superior is based on the theory that the
employee is the agent or is acting for the employer. Therefore the
scope of employment limitation on liability which is a part of the
respondeat superior doctrine is not implicit in the wrong of negligent
hiring. 64

That is, an employer’s liability for her employee’s tortious conduct
within the scope of employment is not predicated on the employer’s
knowledge of the employee’s character, background, or predilections
outside of work. Respondeat superior liability’s focus is on the
workplace itself and the manner in which an employee does her job, or
the way in which an employer trains and supervises her employee.
Negligent hiring and retention, on the other hand, base liability on an
employee’s identity and the sufficiency of her employer’s efforts to suss
out past misdeeds or misconduct. 65
Lutheran Church, 385 F.3d 232, 235 (2d Cir. 2004) (articulating the elements under New York
law); Stalbosky v. Belew, 205 F.3d 890, 894, 896 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating the elements under
Kentucky law). For purposes of clarity and consistency, I have replaced the “master/servant”
formulation with “employer/employee.” While these two different sets of legal classifications
are not coterminous, the differences are not applicable to this discussion.
61 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 cmt. c. The Restatement specifies that “[t]here
may be circumstances in which the only effective control which the master can exercise over
the conduct of his servant is to discharge the servant.” Id.
62 See, e.g., Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1162 (11th Cir. 2005) (“To state a
claim of negligent retention of employees, Mercado must show that Orlando was put on notice
of the harmful propensities of the employees.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation
omitted)); C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 270 P.3d 699, 702 (Cal. 2012)
(discussing a school counselor’s alleged “propensities” for predatory conduct that might put his
employer on notice that he was a potential sex offender); Munroe v. Universal Health Servs.,
Inc., 596 S.E.2d 604, 606 (Ga. 2004); Ponticas v. K.M.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn.
1983) (“Liability is predicated on the negligence of an employer in placing a person with known
propensities, or propensities which should have been discovered by reasonable
investigation . . . .”).
63 See JACOBS, supra note 1, at 73.
64 Di Cosala, 450 A.2d at 515.
65 See, e.g., Marquis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 961 P.2d 1213, 1224–25 (Kan. 1998)
(collecting cases); J. v. Victory Tabernacle Baptist Church, 372 S.E.2d 391, 394 (Va. 1988).
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Criminal records naturally come into this analysis when courts
examine knowledge and foreseeability 66—i.e., whether an employer
knew of the employee’s propensity for bad behavior and whether the
resulting harm to third parties was foreseeable. 67 Whether an employer
knew or should have known of an employee’s propensity for
misfeasance might rest on whether a background check had been
conducted (and how thorough that check was). 68 Similarly, whether the
ultimate tortious conduct and injury were foreseeable might turn on the
nature of any past arrests or convictions. 69 That is, a criminal history
need not render future misconduct foreseeable if the past offense differs
substantially from the ultimate tortious or criminal conduct. 70
While courts consistently have held that failure to perform a
criminal background check does not amount to negligence per se,71
courts frequently treat an employer’s decision to conduct a background
check as evidence of due diligence. 72 And, an employer’s failure to
conduct a background check or failure to investigate suspicious conduct
or gaps in a resume may weigh against an employer and create a triable
issue of fact for the jury. 73 Indeed, as a practical matter, given the
significant rise in employment-related background checks and
technological advances in access to records that make retrieval less
66 While the existence of a duty to the plaintiff frequently is also at issue in negligent hiring
and retention suits, see Di Cosala, 450 A.2d at 516, this inquiry is not relevant to this Article’s
focus on criminal records.
67 See, e.g., D.R.R. v. English Enters., Catv, 356 N.W.2d 580, 583 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984);
Hersh v. Kentfield Builders, Inc., 189 N.W.2d 286, 288 (Mich. 1971); Se. Apartments Mgmt.,
Inc. v. Jackman, 513 S.E.2d 395, 397 (Va. 1999); Timothy L. Creed, Negligent Hiring and
Criminal Rehabilitation: Employing Ex-Convicts, Yet Avoiding Liability, 20 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
183, 188 (2008); Hickox, supra note 14, at 1007–08 (collecting cases).
68 See, e.g., Keen v. Miller Envtl. Grp., Inc., 702 F.3d 239, 246 (5th Cir. 2012); Blair v. Def.
Servs., Inc., 386 F.3d 623, 629 (4th Cir. 2004); Jackman, 513 S.E.2d at 397; Welsh Mfg. v.
Pinkerton’s, Inc., 474 A.2d 436, 442 (R.I. 1984).
69 See, e.g., Muegge v. Heritage Oaks Golf & Country Club, Inc., 209 F. App’x 936, 941 (11th
Cir. 2006); Van Horne v. Muller, 705 N.E.2d 898, 905 (Ill. 1998) (collecting cases); Carlsen v.
Wackenhut Corp., 868 P.2d 882, 888 (Wash. Ct. App.1994).
70 See, e.g., Van Osdol v. Vogt, 908 P.2d 1122, 1132 n.17 (Colo. 1996); McCann v. Varrick
Grp. L.L.C., 84 A.D.3d 591, 591–92 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
71 See Keen, 702 F.3d at 246 n.4 (collecting cases). But see Vaughan v. Harrah’s Las Vegas,
Inc., No. 46821, 2008 WL 6124455, at *5 (Nev. July 7, 2008) (“The tort of negligent hiring
imposes a general duty on an employer to conduct a reasonable background check on a
potential employee to ensure that he or she is suitable for the position.” (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citation omitted)).
72 See, e.g., Blair, 386 F.3d at 632–33 (Widener, J., dissenting); Estevez-Yalcin v. Children’s
Vill., 331 F. Supp. 2d 170, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Dewitt v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 10-CV3319 KAM, 2012 WL 4049805, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2012); Pinkerton’s, Inc., 474 A.2d at
442.
73 See, e.g., Peterson v. RTM Mid-Am., Inc., 434 S.E.2d 521, 523 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); Foster
v. Loft, Inc., 526 N.E.2d 1309, 1311 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988); Megan Oswald, Comment &
Casenote, Private Employers or Private Investigators? A Comment on Negligently Hiring
Applicants with Criminal Records in Ohio, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1771, 1780–81 (2004) (collecting
cases).
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costly and time consuming, 74 it would not be unreasonable to conclude
that a risk-averse employer would make a criminal background check a
prerequisite for any range of jobs. 75
That being said, while courts may focus on the presence or absence
of a background check, it is unclear what criminal records actually tell
us about the foreseeability of future harm (or, for that matter, an
employee’s propensity for tortious or criminal conduct). As an
empirical matter, the probative value of criminal records in assessing
future offending remains a point of some scholarly uncertainty. 76 For
example, in a 2009 study, Alfred Blumstein and Kiminori Nakamura
found that the predictive weight of a past conviction diminishes
significantly over time. 77 Using data from New Yorkers arrested in 1980
for robbery, burglary, and aggravated assault, 78 Blumstein and
Nakamura found that the “hazard rate” (i.e., the risk of re-arrest) 79
declined rapidly after the initial conviction. 80 For the bulk of the subjects
of the study, within five years, the hazard rate had dropped to the
normal rate for record-less New Yorkers of the same age. 81 Further, to
the extent rehabilitation retains any purchase as a justification for
criminal punishment, treating past misconduct as evidence of future
wrongdoing is deeply troubling. In other words, the logic of
74 See, e.g., JACOBS, supra note 1, at 281; Love, supra note 4, at 251; Ben Geiger, Comment,
The Case for Treating Ex-Offenders as a Suspect Class, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1191, 1198–99 (2006).
75 The practical ease of conducting background checks might be relevant to the liability
calculus given some courts focus on other factors such as “the social utility of the defendant’s
conduct, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the harm caused to the plaintiff, the
practical consequences of placing such a burden on the defendant, and any additional elements
disclosed by the particular circumstances of the case.” Connes v. Molalla Transp. Sys., Inc., 831
P.2d 1316, 1320 (Colo. 1992).
76 Compare J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and
Evidence-Based Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329, 1356 (2011) (“The U.S. Sentencing
Commission has suggested that the criminal history categories of the sentencing guidelines,
which categorize offenders by frequency, seriousness, and recency of prior offenses, are highly
predictive of future recidivism.”), with Paul H. Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in
Punishment Theory: Doing Justice as Controlling Crime, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1089, 1101 (2011)
(“Unfortunately, criminal history is a significantly less accurate predictor of future criminality
than would be a direct clinical assessment of a person’s dangerousness.”).
77 See Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Redemption in the Presence of Widespread
Criminal Background Checks, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 327, 349–50 (2009); see also Doe v. United
States, 110 F. Supp. 3d 448, 455 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“That [the party seeking expungement] has
not engaged in any criminal activity since the conduct that brought her before me helps to
prove that point; a long period of law-abiding conduct after a conviction lowers the risk of
recidivism to the same level as someone who has never committed a crime.”).
78 Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 77, at 335.
79 It is worth noting that re-arrest may not be an accurate indication of recidivism and may
be both over- and under-inclusive. Further, given what we know about the ways in which
criminal enforcement tends to be targeted most heavily in marginalized communities, there is
reason to be suspicious that re-arrest might track a defendant’s identity as much as (if not more
than) her criminal conduct.
80 See Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 77, at 338–46.
81 See id. at 339.
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rehabilitation fails if people who have served their sentence continue to
be treated as dangerous or suspect. 82 Nevertheless, despite these flaws,
courts continue to use criminal history as a proxy for risk.
Before moving on to address employee conduct policies, it is worth
pausing to note the significance of negligent hiring and retention in the
body of criminal employment law. While these tort doctrines initially
might not seem as imposing as the statutory components of criminal
employment law, it would be a mistake to understate their significance
in shaping employer preferences and restricting the job market for
people with convictions. A 2001 study found that employers had lost
seventy-two percent of negligent hiring cases that went to trial.83
Average pre-trial settlement amounts of the studied cases topped $1.6
million. 84 Therefore, employers face significant financial incentives to
avoid hiring those with criminal records, or at least to be very careful in
assessing the criminal histories of any applicants. 85 Even for industries
or occupations where no statutory or regulatory diktat bars employing
people with criminal records, the specter of costly civil litigation might
make discriminating against those with criminal records a “rational”
decision for many employers. 86

82 Indeed, this logical flaw permeates the broader realm of collateral consequences. If an
individual has served her sentence or received her punishment, what justification is there for
her to continue to suffer? If the answer is that her conviction indicates that she remains a
danger to society, then either that means a rejection of the rehabilitative idea or a belief that the
mode (or severity) of punishment has failed to advance rehabilitative ends. Alternatively, the
answer might be that she has lost certain rights, privileges, or status as a result of her having
violated community norms. But, that justification sounds a lot like an argument that collateral
consequences are punishment.
83 Holzer et al., supra note 6, at 207.
84 Id.
85 See id. (“The high probability of losing such a [negligent hiring or retention] suit coupled
with the magnitude of settlement awards suggest that fear of litigation may substantially deter
employers from hiring applicants with criminal history records.”).
86 See infra text accompanying notes 184–85 (discussing and critiquing the role of “rational
discrimination” as a driver of collateral consequences in the labor market). The presence of
varying state tort doctrines coupled with the occupational licensing restrictions at the state and
local level further increases the likelihood that employers will over-correct or adopt the most
risk-averse approach to hiring and retentions. If a company does business in multiple
jurisdictions (or employs workers to perform a range of functions), it is not out of the question
that the company might employ ex-offenders in one jurisdiction (or for one function) with
impunity, but that doing so elsewhere would expose them to liability. While such nuance and
variation might be products of different community attitudes toward rehabilitation, employers
might respond by taking the most risk-averse approach and adopting a general hiring policy
that conforms to the most restrictive jurisdiction’s approach to tort liability or licensing. Cf.
Monique C. Lillard, Their Servants’ Keepers: Examining Employer Liability for the Crimes and
Bad Acts of Employees, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 709, 745 (2007) (“Employers, like most potential
defendants, are cautious and tend to overprotect themselves.”).
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Employee Conduct Policies

Where the tort doctrines provide employer liability, employee
conduct policies or handbooks do not necessarily give rise to liability;
instead, they shape the contractual relationship between employer
and employee. 87 “Most state courts have found that an employee
handbook or other policy statement can create an enforceable
contract between employer and employee.”88 In cases where
employers (private or public) have contracted out of the traditional
“at-will” employment, they occasionally take advantage of conduct
policies to restrict or further define the behavior that they expect of
their employees. 89 These policies operate as internal rules or
constraints on employees, granting rights to employers to discipline
workers based on misconduct. 90 In some cases, these policies operate
as a version of “morals clauses”—contractual terms that allow for
discharge or discipline if an employee acts in such a way as to
compromise the image or moral standing of the employer. 91 Such
contracts have a long history in the entertainment and education
industries, where consumers and students, respectively, are assumed to
be particularly responsive to the character and identity of the employee
(i.e., the actor or teacher). 92
Perhaps the most publicly visible form of the policies in the current
labor market has been the proliferation of player conduct policies in the
professional sports context. 93 In the wake of highly publicized off-field
87 See 2 HR SERIES POLICIES AND PRACTICES § 126:25 (rev. ed. May 2018) [hereinafter HR
SERIES].
88 Id.; see also Wooley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985), modified,
499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985). But see Elmore v. Cleary, 399 F.3d 279, 280 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting
that such an agreement need not serve as a contract).
89 See HR SERIES, supra note 87, § 126:25. That said, employment conduct policies are not
found exclusively in unionized shops.
90 See, e.g., Dana H. Freyer, Corporate Compliance Programs for FDA-Regulated Companies:
Incentives for Their Development and the Impact of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for
Organizations, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 225, 236 n.71 (1996); About: 665 Postal Service Standards
of Conduct, U.S. POSTAL SERV. [hereinafter USPS], https://about.usps.com/manuals/elm/html/
elmc6_024.htm.
91 See, e.g., RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. v. Jarrico, 274 P.2d 928, 929 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954)
(“[A]ppellant agreed that during the production and distribution of the motion picture he
would conduct himself with due regard to public conventions and morals and would not do
anything which would tend to degrade him or bring him into public disgrace, obloquy, ill will
or ridicule.”); Marka B. Fleming et al., Morals Clauses for Educators in Secondary and
Postsecondary Schools: Legal Applications and Constitutional Concerns, 2009 B.Y.U. EDUC. &
L.J. 67, 67–68 (2009) (“In general, morals clauses in employment contracts allow an employer
to terminate employment when an employee’s conduct is potentially detrimental to the
employer’s interest.”); Noah B. Kressler, Using the Morals Clause in Talent Agreements: A
Historical, Legal and Practical Guide, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 235, 235–36 (2005).
92 See Fleming, et al., supra note 91, at 67–68; Kressler, supra note 91, at 235–36.
93 See, e.g., Chris Deubert et al., All Four Quarters: A Retrospective and Analysis of the 2011
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and off-court incidents, the National Football League (NFL) and
National Basketball League (NBA) have implemented conduct policies
that govern the behavior of their players at all times. 94 These policies
allow the league commissioners to discipline players who are arrested
for or convicted of crimes. 95 For purposes of this Article, it is critical to
note that this misconduct need not take place at work or be directly tied
to workplace safety. 96 Instead, in some cases, the employer may exercise
authority to fire or discipline an employee based on actual or alleged
misconduct that has occurred when a worker is “off the clock” and
conducting personal business. 97 In one highly publicized incident, NFL
Collective Bargaining Process and Agreement in the National Football League, 19 UCLA ENT. L.
REV. 1, 63 (2012); Marc Edelman, Speech: A Different Look at Compliance in Professional Sports:
Why the NFL Personal Conduct Policy Might Be More Illegal Than the Very Conduct It Seeks to
Regulate, 7 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 90 (2011); Michael A. Mahone, Jr.,
Note, Sentencing Guidelines for the Court of Public Opinion: An Analysis of the National
Football League’s Revised Personal Conduct Policy, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 181, 183–84
(2008); Adam B. Marks, Note, Personnel Foul on the National Football League Players
Association: How Union Executive Director Gene Upshaw Failed the Union’s Members By Not
Fighting the Enactment of the Personal Conduct Policy, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1581, 1583 (2008); J.J.
Adande, Can Silver Fix NBA’s Off-Court Issues?, ESPN (Sept. 4, 2013), http://espn.go.com/nba/
story/_/id/9634662/nba-adam-silver-nba-court-conduct; William C. Rhoden, Principal Goodell
Sets a New Tone for the N.F.L., N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/
02/sports/football/02rhoden.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=C41C19332247371352
D4642653B04331&gwt=pay (describing NFL commissioner Roger Goodell as a “law and order
commissioner” due to his focus on off-field issues).
94 See generally Mahone, Jr., supra note 93; Adande, supra note 93.
95 See generally Kim & Parlow, supra note 15.
96 See NAT’L BASKETBALL ASS’N, CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE NATIONAL
BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION 45 (May 29, 2012), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/files/221035054nba-constitution-and-by-laws.pdf (granting the commissioner the power to fine or suspend a
player who “shall have been guilty of conduct that does not conform to standards of morality or
fair play, that does not comply at all times with all federal, state, and local laws, or that is
prejudicial or detrimental to the Association”); see also HR SERIES, supra note 87, § 126:25 (“If
employers wish to hold employees accountable for their actions while they are away from work,
that rule should be clearly set forth in the employee practices and procedures and
communicated to employees. Conduct away from work should be subject to employer scrutiny
only if the conduct has a clear nexus to the employer’s business. For example, a bank should
probably discharge any employee convicted of theft. A children’s television host might be
disciplined or discharged for a DUI.”); USPS, supra note 90 (“Employees are expected to
conduct themselves during and outside of working hours in a manner that reflects favorably
upon the Postal Service. Although it is not the policy of the Postal Service to interfere with the
private lives of employees, it does require that postal employees be honest, reliable, trustworthy,
courteous, and of good character and reputation. The Federal Standards of Ethical Conduct
referenced in 662.1 also contain regulations governing the off–duty behavior of postal
employees. Employees must not engage in criminal, dishonest, notoriously disgraceful,
immoral, or other conduct prejudicial to the Postal Service. Conviction for a violation of any
criminal statute may be grounds for disciplinary action against an employee, including removal
of the employee, in addition to any other penalty imposed pursuant to statute.”). But see
Conduct: Employee Conduct and Work Rules Policy, SOC’Y HUMAN RES. MGMT. (June 30, 2014),
http://www.shrm.org/templatestools/samples/policies/pages/cms_006651.aspx (providing a
sample conduct policy that emphasizes behavior at the workplace and enumerates a list of
unacceptable behavior, including possession and distribution of narcotics and weapons).
97 See, e.g., Terry L. Leap, When Can You Fire for Off-Duty Conduct?, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.
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Commissioner Roger Goodell initially suspended Ray Rice of the
Baltimore Ravens for two games for allegedly assaulting his fiancée,
Janay Palmer. 98 After a video surfaced that showed Rice knocking
Palmer unconscious, public outcry caused Goodell to attempt to
increase the punishment for Rice indefinitely and declare that domestic
violence incidents would receive harsher treatment going forward. 99 Put
simply, the public demanded a response beyond what the criminal
system offered, 100 and Goodell—as a voice of the NFL owners—was able
to mete out that punishment. 101 There are numerous reasons why the
world of professional sports is not representative of the U.S. labor
market, but the Rice case nonetheless should serve as a useful
illustration of a conduct policy’s application. 102
1988, at 28.
98 See Jill Martin & Steve Almsay, Ray Rice Wins Suspension Appeal, CNN (Nov. 30, 2014,
12:59 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/28/us/ray-rice-reinstated.
99 See id.
100 See Withers, supra note 15 at 149–50; Post, supra note 15.
101 While earlier player conduct policies and disciplinary actions focused on drugs, alcohol,
and the specter of other criminal misconduct, recent disciplinary actions and public reactions
often have focused on intimate partner violence and have taken on the language of gender
justice. See, e.g., Dan Gunderman, Former Pro Bowler Greg Hardy Vying for NFL Return, Says
He’s ‘Not a Psychopath’, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 2, 2017, 3:15 PM), http://
www.nydailynews.com/sports/football/pro-bowler-greg-hardy-vying-nfl-return-article1.3130469 (cataloging cases of NFL discipline in domestic violence cases); Robert Salonga, 49ers
Star Reuben Foster Charged with 3 Felonies in Domestic Violence Case, MERCURY NEWS (Apr.
12, 2008, 4:42 AM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/04/13/49ers-star-reuben-fostercharged-in-domestic-violence-and-weapon-case-2-2-2 (same). The past year has seen a
dramatic rise in public attention to issues of gender justice in the workplace with the rise of the
#MeToo movement. Unlike many of the cases addressed in this Article, much of the conduct
addressed by #MeToo activists took place in workplaces or was more explicitly related to the
workplace or employer/employee power dynamics. Nevertheless, as of the time of this Article’s
publication, the legal and policy responses to #MeToo still are unknown. It is conceivable that
we might see some interaction between the #MeToo activism and criminal employment law,
but, as of now, that remains an open question.
102 Four elements of major league professional sports in the United States render them
largely unrepresentative of the labor market at large: (1) the high salary and prestige associated
with players’ participation; (2) the degree of publicity that the players and their actions receive;
(3) the degree of skill required to participate; and (4) the power of unions. Cf. Benjamin Levin,
Blue-Collar Crime: Conspiracy, Organized Labor, and the Anti-Union Civil Rico Claim, 75 ALB.
L. REV. 559, 628 (2012) (examining the exceptional nature of labor and employment law in the
sports and entertainment context). In their treatment of professional sports discipline, Janine
Kim and Matthew Parlow highlight the publicity point as a key component of employee
discipline in professional sports. See Kim & Parlow, supra note 15, at 575–79. While I will
return to the publicity point, it is worth noting that the other factors (and, perhaps to a lesser
extent, even the publicity factor) all speak to the bargaining power or relative market power of
the employees. That is, one of the reasons that I think we should be concerned about criminal
employment law is the power imbalance in the market and the ways in which those with
criminal records, particularly low-income individuals, people of color, and others from
marginalized communities face even greater challenges in the labor market due to their
criminal status. See generally PAGER, supra note 1 (finding that black job applicants with
criminal records faced greater discrimination than white applicants with criminal records).
Therefore, while the professional sports context may serve as a useful way to understand and
illustrate the public/private dimensions of criminal employment law, the Rice case and other
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These personnel or employee conduct policies have received less
scholarly attention than negligent hiring and retention. And, aside from
the sports context, they have received limited public attention. Indeed, it
is difficult to determine how ubiquitous they are. 103 But, I think it is fair
to treat them as closely related to the tort doctrines discussed above and
as a piece in the broader criminal employment law puzzle. Employee
conduct policies function as part of a legal regime in which employers
are often viewed as responsible for the actions and characters of their
employees. The tort law doctrines discussed in the previous Section rest
on this view of the employment relationship, so it should not be much
of a reach to consider those doctrines as closely related to a set of private
orderings that re-inscribe and delineate the terms of that employment
relationship. Viewed in this light, the policies might serve one of several
functions for employers.
First, they might operate as a means of shielding employers from
liability under theories of negligent hiring and retention (or other
analogous tort or statutory theories of liability). If an employer includes
a specific term forbidding her employee from acting criminally (or
perhaps even being arrested), and if the employer monitors her
employee and disciplines based on breach of the policy’s terms, then
perhaps she might be able to defend against suits arising from the
employee’s misconduct. 104 In other words, an employer is “putting in
writing” its commitment to preventing employee misconduct,
preemptively going on record to disapprove of conduct by an employee

cases that have been the focus of other articles about employee conduct policies may well
distract from the underlying structural considerations that make criminal employment law so
worrying. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to disregard these cases and this context altogether
as: (1) professional sports are highly publicized, meaning that the rules, social institutions, and
legal orders that shape them stand a greater chance of entering the public consciousness, see
generally Levin, supra note at 568–72 (advocating a focus on the cultural awareness of legal
rules and norms); and (2) if a market defined by such a powerful group of employees still
displays such grants of power to employers, there is good reason to assume that such dynamics
might be even more pronounced in other markets—such as those for low-wage, unskilled
labor—where employee bargaining power is lacking.
103 A number of obstacles stand in the way of determining how widespread these policies are
and what conduct they reach. Primarily, unlike the licensing statutes discussed above, see supra
text accompanying notes 41–48, private employment contracts, employee manuals, and
personal conduct policies are not necessarily parts of the public record. While references to
employee conduct policies and their terms appear in judicial opinions, see, e.g., Elmore v.
Cleary, 399 F.3d 279, 280 (3d Cir. 2005); Morris v. Collis Foods, Inc., No. W2001-00918-COAR3CV, 2002 WL 1349514, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 19, 2002), these passing mentions or
discussions of specific provisions provide only a fleeting glance at the legal landscape.
104 See HR SERIES, supra note 87, § 126:25. Because respondeat superior liability rests on an
employee acting within the scope of her employee when she acts tortiously, see Lev v. Beverly
Enterprises-Mass., Inc., 929 N.E.2d 303, 308 (Mass. 2010), closely circumscribing the scope of
employment would aid an employer in defending against tort suits relying on such a theory.
However, tort liability for negligent hiring does not always require a finding that an employee
acted within the scope of her employment. See Di Cosala v. Kay, 450 A.2d 508, 515 (N.J. 1982).
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that might otherwise expose the employer to liability. 105 Therefore, the
policies might function as a natural outgrowth of negligent
hiring/retention theories and, perhaps more broadly, respondeat
superior liability. 106
Second, and perhaps relatedly, the policies might serve as a sort of
public relations or cultural framing strategy for employers. 107
Particularly in response to public perception of lawlessness or
callousness on the part of an employer or an industry, such policies can
signal awareness and engagement. 108 That is, the presence (and perhaps
the publicizing) of such policies might signal to consumers or clients
that the employer takes her social responsibility seriously. An employer
does not want “criminals” on her payroll, and she cares about more than
the bottom line—or, at least, so the policy signals. 109 Rather than
waiting for the state to take criminal action or allowing the state to
define the terms of punishment, the employer is signaling that she is
willing to impose her own moral condemnation. 110
This explanation finds particular purchase in the professional
sports context, where public outcry about players’ actions off the court
have prompted league commissioners to draft and aggressively enforce
105 But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 cmt. c. (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“[A]
railroad company which knows that the crews of its coal trains are in the habit of throwing coal
from the cars as they pass along tracks laid through a city street, to the danger of travelers, is
subject to liability if it retains the delinquents in its employment, although it has promulgated
rules strictly forbidding such practices.” (emphasis added)).
106 But cf. Di Cosala, 450 A.2d at 515 (clarifying the different legal standard for respondeat
superior and negligent hiring claims).
107 See Joel Bakan, The Invisible Hand of Law: Private Regulation and the Rule of Law, 48
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 279, 291 (2015) (“Construction of that conscience has been underway in the
form of corporate social responsibility (CSR) since the 1980s, when private regulation first
emerged. Today, CSR is mainstream, a mantra for business leaders, a ubiquitous presence in
marketing and public relations campaigns, and an organizing principle for earnest gatherings of
NGOs, scholars, business leaders, and government officials.” (footnote omitted)).
108 See Elizabeth F. Brown, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Is There a Need for a Safe
Harbor for Aspirational Corporate Codes of Conduct?, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 367, 373–77
(2008); Karen Bradshaw Schulz, New Governance and Industry Culture, 88 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 2515, 2521 (2013) (“A key dispute about corporate social responsibility is whether firms’
practices meaningfully increase social welfare or merely provide an illusion that firms are good
citizens.”).
109 Cf. Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit: Rethinking Corporate Social
Responsibility and Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster, 85 TUL. L. REV. 983, 985 (2011)
(“Part of the problem [with the legal and social treatment of BP] lies in what some term
‘greenwashing’ and what we dub ‘faux [corporate social responsibility].’ By greenwashing, a
corporation might increase its sales or boost its brand image through environmental rhetoric,
but at the same time either pollute the environment or decline to spend money on the
environment, employee welfare, or otherwise honor its commitments to other constituencies.”).
110 This framing or justification for conduct policies jibes with public preferences for “tough
on crime” policies and with public assumptions about the guilt of those arrested for or charged
with crimes. See generally Benjamin Levin, De-Naturalizing Criminal Law: Of Public
Perceptions and Procedural Protections, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1777, 1777–79 (2013) (describing and
critiquing this cultural perception of the criminal system).
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“player conduct policies” that allow for fines, suspensions, and all-out
bans based on convictions, arrests, and—in some cases—even
investigations. 111 In these situations, sports fans or commentators would
have had no basis to pursue legal action—by allowing Rice to continue
playing in the NFL, Goodell would not have harmed viewers or NFL
fans. 112 Therefore, it seems much more plausible that the policies reflect
a strategy of public presentation, rather than an effort to avoid
liability. 113 It is worth noting that the sports context is unusual in the
degree of publicity that the policies receive—crafting an employee
conduct policy for public relations purposes would not make much of
an impact if consumers were unaware of the policy (or of the underlying
misconduct). 114 Nevertheless, viewed through the broader lens of
corporate social responsibility, any attempt to craft an employersanctioned moral, ethical, or behavioral code might reflect an attempt at
crafting an image of a good corporate citizen. Such an image might
render an employer’s business more profitable or might even help to
shield the employer from external regulation or suit. 115
Finally, and perhaps most straightforwardly, we might view these
policies as an attempt to establish greater employer control over
employees. After all, whether these policies are merely aspirational or
whether they are enforced actively, they purport to set the parameters of
employee conduct and set up employers to police those boundaries. As a
general matter, employers presumably wish to control the behavior of
their employees to the extent possible. 116 And, to the extent that the law
See supra text accompanying notes 93–94.
See supra text accompanying notes 98–102. Any harm to the NFL would be of an
intangible and not legally cognizable variety (i.e., something like “damage to the integrity of the
game”). Perhaps rewarding individuals who behave badly with lucrative contracts, publicity,
and highly desirable jobs might do some harm to society writ large. But, again, this harm
sounds much more in the language of the public psyche, collective, consciousness, or some
other, non-legally cognizable theory of harm.
113 It is certainly true that the motivation need not be exclusively one or the other and that
an intent to improve public relations might be complementary to or a part of a broader effort to
avoid liability.
114 See supra note 102; see also Kim & Parlow, supra note 15; Post, supra note 15 (“I
understand that perhaps the NFL is a special case, because it is in the entertainment business,
and has to be particularly sensitive to public opinion and to be sure that its product meets with
the public’s approval, so it needs to take the law into its own hands for reasons not applicable to
other private firms.”).
115 See, e.g., Bakan, supra note 107, at 291; Ronen Shamir, Socially Responsible Private
Regulation: World-Culture or World-Capitalism?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 313, 314 (2011) (“CSR
was transformed from being associated mainly with displays of good ‘corporate citizenship’ to a
scientifically validated form of corporate risk management and, more generally, into a
perceived commercial asset.”).
116 See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Labor Law Obstacles to the Collective Negotiation and
Implementation of Employee Stock Ownership Plans: A Response to Henry Hansmann and Other
“Survivalists”, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 957, 984–85 (1998) (“Employers or managers often will
seek to protect their managerial power by resisting employee ownership plans involving
employee control. . . . Employers, and particularly managers, may, therefore, resist attempts to
111
112
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allows for—and may even encourage—such control, 117 why wouldn’t
employers try to exert it? This rationale might be a close relative of the
first two justifications: (1) the law assumes that employers “control”
their employees, so it is in an employer’s best interest to exercise this
control fully if she might ultimately be liable for her employee’s
conduct118 and (2) consumers and the public at large might view the
conduct of employees as having the tacit approval of their employer. 119
If that is the case, then it seems only logical that an employer would try
to shape this conduct in any way possible.
Ultimately, the three justifications for employee conduct policies
appear to overlap significantly. Each finds some basis in an underlying
assumption that it is the place of the employer to control the activities of
her employee. Or, perhaps more broadly, each relies on a belief that an
employer is the actor or institution (rather than, or in addition to, the
state) that ought to discipline individuals who behave badly. 120 Whether
the exercise of control is responsive to a descriptive recognition of the
legal lay of the land or a normative response to public demands depends
on which rationale we view as the primary driver of these policies.
Regardless of what is actually motivating each individual employer,
it is important to recognize the potential significance of these policies if
broadly applied—or, broadly written. Imagine two different types of
conduct policies (or, two types of provisions), both of which proscribe
conduct that is also criminal. First, consider an employee conduct policy
decrease their control over firm policy . . . .”).
117 The presence of employer “control” over a worker remains the touchstone of the
common law test for whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor. See, e.g.,
Daughtrey v. Honeywell, Inc., 3 F.3d 1488, 1496 (11th Cir. 1993) (identifying the key
component in a determination of employment as the “hiring party’s right to control the
manner and means by which the work is accomplished” (quoting Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987
F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1993))); Tieberg v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 471 P.2d 975, 977–78
(Cal. 1970); J.M. v. Shell Oil Co., 922 S.W.2d 759, 764 (Mo. 1996) (en banc); Hageman v. Park
W. Gardens, 480 N.W.2d 223, 226 (N.D. 1992); Averett v. Grange, 909 P.2d 246, 249 (Utah
1995) (“In workers’ compensation cases, this court has consistently held that whether an
employer-employee relationship exists depends upon the employer’s right to control the
employee.”); Mountain Lodge Ass’n v. Crum & Forster Indem. Co., 558 S.E.2d 336, 342 (W. Va.
2001).
118 See John Fabian Witt, Note, The Transformation of Work and the Law of Workplace
Accidents, 1842–1910, 107 YALE L.J. 1467, 1480 (1998) (“For employers . . . a legal regime that
imposed liability for work accidents could have created incentives to increase the extent of their
control over the workplace and over the day-to-day conduct of employees.”).
119 See Gilbert v. Sycamore Mun. Hosp., 622 N.E.2d 788, 794 (Ill. 1993); Howard Levin,
Note, Hospital Vicarious Liability for Negligence By Independent Contractor Physicians: A New
Rule for New Times, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1291, 1300–03.
120 This view could be defined in economic terms as a belief that the employer is the “leastcost avoider” when it comes to preventing injury as a result of an employee’s conduct. See
Richard J. Butler & John D. Worrall, Wage and Injury Response to Shifts in Workplace Liability,
61 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 181, 182 (2008). Alternatively, the view could stem from a moralsfocused belief that if an employer benefits from the conduct of its employees, it would be wrong
for society to have to bear the costs of employee misconduct.
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that proscribes certain behavior at the workplace because that behavior
causes unsafe working conditions or directly affects the quality of the
product or service. (For example, if a mining company prohibits its
miners from committing theft and using narcotics on company
property. 121) Second, consider a policy that bans criminal conduct that
occurs away from the workplace and when an employee is not on duty.
(For example, if the mining company prohibits its miners from “being
convicted of [a] felony criminal offense.”) 122
Conduct policies of the first variety certainly might be used by
employers to restrict workers unduly or for pretextual purposes. But—at
least facially—they are unremarkable: rules are a staple of any workplace
or industry, and prohibiting conduct that might endanger other workers
or interfere with the functioning of the workplace is not noteworthy.123
Therefore, I want to focus on the second variety (blanket prohibitions
on criminality or criminal conduct). Without a clear tether to the safe or
efficient functioning of an employer’s business, these kinds of terms or
policies may function as criminal employment law. The employer
effectively acts to punish privately, either in addition to, or instead of,
the state. Certainly, we might explain this kind of behavior using each of
the three rationales traced above. But, just because we can rationalize a
policy does not make it normatively desirable. Do we trust employers as
much as, or even more than, the state to respond to criminal conduct? 124
If employers might have private concerns (e.g., avoiding liability,
maximizing profits) 125 that ostensibly are foreign to the criminal system
and traditional purposes of punishment, why should they have a role to
play in furthering the criminal system’s ends? And, why should
employers take any action before a formal determination of guilt? (I will
return to these questions later.) 126
Having set up the legal framework for criminal employment law,
the next two Parts will take two different tacks to examine criminal
employment law’s flaws. Part III asks how to address the expansive
scope and effects of criminal employment law. Part IV will return to the
broader question of employers’ role as private actors in the criminal
system and the ways in which the dual public/private nature of criminal
employment law highlights problems with the legal treatment of
employment.
See Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 705 (Wyo. 1985).
Id.
123 For example, the employee handbook in Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks also
prohibits “refusing or willfully failing to carry out proper instructions,” “willfully damaging
plant or personal property,” “violation of safety rules,” and “falsification of records.” Id.
124 See Post, supra note 15.
125 See supra text accompanying notes 104–19; cf. Jain, supra note 29, at 1232 (examining the
incentives of individual prosecutors).
126 See infra Part IV.
121
122
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III. THE RESPONSES TO CRIMINAL EMPLOYMENT LAW
How might the legal system lessen the unduly harsh impact of
criminal law? By addressing a range of proposed legal reforms, this Part
continues to examine how criminal employment law operates and why
employers might discriminate against individuals with criminal records.
I briefly examine a set of policy responses that scholars have identified
as a means of mitigating collateral consequences, specifically as they
apply to employment-related consequences. By pointing out the
limitations of these solutions, I hope to highlight the particular
problems posed by criminal employment law’s merger of public and
private legal regimes.
Whether employment consequences are best viewed as a form of
punishment or as a costly side effect, they are an important part of the
daily functioning of the criminal legal system. They present an area in
which to consider the ways courts or law makers might exercise control
over the spread and operation of the criminal system’s societal impact.
As U.S. District Court Judge Lynn Adelman notes in calling for systemic
reform:
With respect to collateral consequences, despite the growing body of
model laws and best practices created by entities interested in law
reform, such as the American Bar Association, no state has yet
comprehensively reformed the ways in which people with criminal
convictions are prevented from participating in civic and business
activities. 127

Private employers and private organizations might pose a set of
obstacles and considerations absent from the public sector. Yet, that
does not lessen the need to study and amend the ways in which these
private arrangements continue to extend the force of criminal
punishment.
Therefore, this Part takes up the question of what such reforms
might look like. I will describe several proposals, some of which have
been raised by scholars, attorneys, and activists. A number of these
proposals already have been adopted in certain jurisdictions, and a
number more might prove beneficial if adopted. In my examination,
though, I will note the potential limitations of each solution. These
limitations ultimately lead to the discussion in Part IV. There, I will turn
to the peculiarities of and problems with the public/private nature of
employment and the role of private employers operating in the context
of the criminal system. My goal is not to reject these proposals; for the
reasons discussed below, I think that they might be positive, but, by
127

189.

Lynn Adelman, Criminal Justice Reform: The Present Moment, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 181,
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noting their limitations, I hope to emphasize the deeper structural
problems posed by the relationship between private employers and the
criminal system. 128
A.

Ending or Restricting Tort Liability

Perhaps the most simple and straightforward remedy to the
problems caused by negligent hiring and retention doctrines would be
to abolish these tort doctrines altogether. 129 This fix could come via
judicial action (as these doctrines are judicially constructed) or
legislative action. 130 Under such a hypothetical legal regime, employers
would no longer be liable for having negligently hired or retained
employees with criminal records. If the fear of tort liability currently
keeps employers from hiring or retaining individuals with criminal
records, 131 then removing the specter of tort liability should remove the
bad incentives. Employers might still be liable for the conduct of their
employees via respondeat superior, but that liability would turn on
employees’ conduct performed within the scope of employment. 132
Notably, these proposed tort law regimes would not exclude all
such liability for the hiring and retention of individuals with criminal
records. A number of the proposals would allow for (or require)
employers to consider certain types of criminal history when dealing
with certain types of crimes. This exception or carve-out has certain
intuitive appeal: if, for example, a job applicant has a history of violent
offenses, wouldn’t we worry if she were hired for a security guard
position where she would be licensed to use force against civilians? Or,
if an applicant had been charged with child abuse, wouldn’t an employer
be wise to consider these past offenses before hiring her as a daycare
worker? If the touchstone of negligence liability is foreseeability, maybe
we could imagine a regime in which tort liability was closely
circumscribed in an effort to identify only the most foreseeable of
injuries and to predict which employees would create the greatest risk.
128 The list of policy proposals in this Section is not exhaustive. Cf. Jennifer Leavitt, Note,
Walking a Tightrope: Balancing Competing Public Interests in the Employment of Criminal
Offenders, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1281, 1308 (2002) (describing state tax credit systems);
Christopher Stafford, Note, Finding Work: How to Approach the Intersection of Prisoner
Reentry, Employment, and Recidivism, 13 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 261, 269 (2006) (noting a
possible system of financial incentives for employers to hire the formerly incarcerated). Nor are
the discussions of the proposals themselves meant to be comprehensive. Rather, this Part gives
a general overview of possible solutions as a way of highlighting the deeper problems that
criminal employment law reveals.
129 See JACOBS, supra note 1, at 278–79.
130 See id.
131 See supra Section II.A.
132 See supra text accompanying notes 63–64.
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This line of analysis quickly gets us back to a central problem: in
order to determine if an employee or applicant poses such a risk,
someone would need to inspect her criminal record. This approach
could take two forms: (1) the state formally could certify that an exoffender was not a future risk or was suitable to certain types of
employment 133; or (2) employers could be expected to survey criminal
records and assess the future risk posed by a job applicant based on her
record. 134 Either approach leads through (or at least into) the quagmire
of criminal record keeping. 135 In an era of plea bargaining, it is difficult
to conclude that a criminal conviction for offense X necessarily means
that X was the only offense committed or that a jury ever determined
there was proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant committed
X. 136 And, just because employers have access to more information via
the internet does not mean that this information is always accurate or
that employers are equipped to interpret the information they find. 137
Even aside from accuracy, either approach, public or private,
should raise concerns. Public certificates of rehabilitations—which six
states will grant in some cases 138—are both over- and under-inclusive.
That is, are there not some cases where an applicant might be
rehabilitated to enter certain lines of work, but not others? And, perhaps
more importantly, such certificates imply that some people with
133 See, e.g., N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 753(2) (McKinney 2018) (“[T]he public agency or private
employer shall also give consideration to a certificate of relief from disabilities or a certificate of
good conduct issued to the applicant, which certificate shall create a presumption of
rehabilitation in regard to the offense or offenses specified therein.”); Love, supra note 4, at
269–71; Mukamal & Samuels, supra note 41, at 1505.
134 See, e.g., JACOBS, supra note 1, at 283–84; Katherine A. Peebles, Note, Negligent Hiring
and the Information Age: How State Legislatures Can Save Employers from Inevitable Liability,
53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1397, 1418 (2012).
135 Given significant technological advances and variations among states, municipalities, and
other record-keeping units, this is a rapidly changing area of law and practice shaped both by
formal rules and informal practices. Nevertheless, James Jacobs’s recent work on criminal
records in the United States provides a valuable overview of criminal records’ role in the U.S.
criminal legal system. See generally JACOBS, supra note 1.
136 See id. at 284–85.
137 See, e.g., Employer Access to Criminal Background Checks: The Need for Efficiency and
Accuracy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism & Homeland Sec., 110th Cong. 7
(2007) (statement of Frank A.S. Campbell, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Policy, United States Department of Justice), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG110hhrg34928/html/CHRG-110hhrg34928.htm; Walker Newell, The Legacy of Nixon, Reagan,
and Horton: How the Tough on Crime Movement Enabled a New Regime of Race-Influenced
Employment Discrimination, 15 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 3, 30–31 (2013); Sarah K.
Starnes, Note, Interviewing Stripes Instead of Suits: Addressing the Inadequacy of Indiana’s
Current Legislation and How to Assist Employers in Effectively Hiring Convicted Felons, 49 VAL.
U. L. REV. 311, 321 (2014); Editorial, Opinion, Accuracy in Criminal Background Checks, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/10/opinion/accuracy-in-criminalbackground-checks.html.
138 See Kristen A. Williams, Comment, Employing Ex-Offenders: Shifting the Evaluation of
Workplace Risks and Opportunities from Employers to Corrections, 55 UCLA L. REV. 521, 547
n.178 (2007) (collecting sources).
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criminal records are not rehabilitated and that people with criminal
records must be rehabilitated. Given that the criminal system does not
embrace a single theory of punishment, 139 and that it is not clear that all
punishment is designed with a rehabilitative goal, 140 it seems peculiar to
use rehabilitation as the benchmark for reentry. Would the implication
be that serving a sentence was not sufficient to atone for a crime? And
do we really think that any and all law breaking is so anti-social as to
require rehabilitation? Courts and scholars have struggled with the best
way to predict future offending; 141 it is not clear how certificates could
serve as sufficiently reliable predictors of future dangerousness.
Private analysis of criminal records also poses problems. Employee
privacy is a casualty of background checks generally, 142 and determining
how egregious past misfeasance was or how much of a risk the
prospective employee might be could require further intrusions.
Although state-issued certificates would be problematic, employers’
judgments regarding future dangerousness or likelihood of recidivism
seem even more troubling. What epistemic advantage do employers
have in assessing these issues, and what reason do we have to think that
employers have the same views or incentives as criminal justice actors
when it comes time to determine how to react to past offenses? 143 By
continuing to require employers to conduct background checks, this
narrowed tort liability still would not get employers out of the business
of analyzing criminal records.
Finally, it is worth noting that the prospect of tort liability might
not be the only risk-focused legal regime pushing employers not to hire
people with criminal records. Insurance policies might preclude
coverage or raise premiums when employers did not use background
139 See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 18-2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1994) (stating
multiple purposes for sentencing); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (same);
Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are Only Bad Acts Good Sentencing Factors?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1109,
1137 (2008).
140 See, e.g., Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of
Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 841–45 (2001) (arguing that a predictive or
incapacitation-based approach had replaced rehabilitation as a primary purpose of
punishment); Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on an Emerging
Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 449 (1992) (arguing that
incapacitation had become the dominant ideology driving criminal law); Benjamin Levin, Guns
and Drugs, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2173 (2016).
141 See, e.g., Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 241 (2007); Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84,
104 (2003); Bernard E. Harcourt, Against Prediction: Sentencing, Policing, and Punishing in an
Actuarial Age 2–5 (U. Chi. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper No. 94,
2005); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of
Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 807 (2014).
142 See, e.g., JACOBS, supra note 1, at 284–85; Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the
Criminal Justice System: Information Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law
Enforcement Exemptions, 111 MICH. L. REV. 485, 511 (2013); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Privacy
Versus Antidiscrimination, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 363 (2008).
143 I will return to these questions in Part IV.
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checks or when they hired people with criminal records. Certainly,
insurers might be less likely to adopt such restrictions absent the threat
of tort liability under negligent hiring/retention. But—based on
actuarial calculations and general risk averseness—insurers might retain
these bars in a world without negligent hiring or negligent retention
liability. Therefore, insurers might continue to re-inscribe the same
troubling incentives, even if tort doctrine ostensibly fixed the problem.
B.

Ban the Box

Rather than relying exclusively on tort-based solutions, some
scholars and activists have advocated statutory restrictions on
employers’ use of criminal records in hiring. 144 The ban-the-box
movement, both domestically and internationally, has pushed for
legislation to prohibit employers from considering criminal history in
hiring decisions. 145 By preventing employers from initially inquiring
into criminal history, ban-the-box laws (i.e., laws that “remove the
check box or question from employment applications that asks whether
the applicant has ever been convicted of a crime”146) attempt to level the
playing field for those with criminal records. 147
This strategy to curb collateral consequences in the labor market
has achieved some political success. In 1998, Hawai’i passed the first
legislation to remove criminal history questions from employment
applications. 148 In the ensuing decades, the movement spread to other
jurisdictions. 149 As of April 2018, one hundred and fity cities and thirtyone states had passed some form of ban-the-box legislation. 150 Further,
in November 2015, President Obama “called on Congress to follow a
growing number of states, cities, and private companies that have
144 This Section expands on arguments introduced in Benjamin Levin, Obama’s Post-Prison
Jobs Plan Is Not Enough, TIME (May 12, 2016), http://time.com/4326135/obama-ban-the-box.
145 See, e.g., Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2, 79 (2015); Joseph
Fishkin, The Anti-Bottleneck Principle in Employment Discrimination Law, 91 WASH. U. L. REV.
1429, 1455 (2014); Jessica S. Henry & James B. Jacobs, Ban the Box to Promote Ex-Offender
Employment, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 755, 757 (2007); Christina O’Connell, Note, Ban
the Box: A Call to the Federal Government to Recognize a New Form of Employment
Discrimination, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2801, 2804 (2015).
146 Fishkin, supra note 145, at 1455.
147 See Adam M. Samaha & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Don’t Ask, Must Tell—and Other
Combinations, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 919, 930 n.48 (2015).
148 See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2.5 (West 2018). The “ban-the-box” name was later
adopted by the activist group “All of Us or None.” See Eumi K. Lee, Commentary, The
Centerpiece to Real Reform? Political, Legal, and Social Barriers to Reentry in California, 7
HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 243, 255–56 (2010).
149 See, e.g., O’Connell, supra note 145, at 2804–06; Smith, supra note 17, at 212.
150 See Beth Avery & Phil Hernandez, Ban the Box: U.S. Cities, Counties, and States Adopt
Fair Hiring Policies, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT (Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.nelp.org/publication/
ban-the-box-fair-chance-hiring-state-and-local-guide.
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decided to ‘ban the box’ on job applications” and directed the Office of
Personnel Management to delay background checks “until later in the
hiring process.” 151 And, in 2016, President Obama went so far as to
propose that all federal employers adopt ban-the-box rules. 152 In short,
banning the box is an increasingly mainstream approach to the
problems of reentry and re-employment for the previously incarcerated.
However, these statutes, ordinances, and policies have some
significant limitations. Most only restrict the behavior of public
employers; 153 they have frequent exceptions for types of employment
and classes of employment; 154 and they often are silent as to when and to
what extent employers may consider criminal history. 155 And, like a
number of other policy proposals discussed here, ban-the-box has little
to tell us about the rights of workers who have already been hired and
then are arrested or charged with a crime. As Jonathan Smith, thenAssistant Counsel to the NAACP observed, ban-the-box provisions “do
not, for the most part, preclude an employer’s consideration of criminal
history information. They simply delay it to later stages in the screening
process.” 156 That is, these provisions do not constitute a comprehensive
anti-discrimination regime. Rather, they may offer a foothold for some
job applicants to climb over the structural obstacles of life with a
criminal record, but they do not necessarily remove the obstacles. 157
Further, a recent study by Amanda Agan and Sonja Starr showed
that ban-the-box policies might produce some troubling unintended
consequences—specifically, ban-the-box might increase employer
discrimination in job callbacks. 158 Based on a sample of New York and
New Jersey employers, Agan and Starr found that after these laws went
into effect, “white applicants went from being 7% more likely to receive
a callback than similar black applicants to being 45% more likely.”159
Agan and Starr offer two possible explanations: (1) “statistical
discrimination against black men”—absent background checks,
151 Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: President Obama Announces New Actions to
Promote Rehabilitation and Reintegration for the Formerly-Incarcerated (Nov. 2, 2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/02/fact-sheet-president-obamaannounces-new-actions-promote-rehabilitation.
152 Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: During National Reentry Week, Reducing
Barriers to Reentry and Employment for Formerly Incarcerated Individuals (Apr. 29, 2016),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/29/fact-sheet-during-national-reentryweek-reducing-barriers-reentry-and.
153 See Smith, supra note 17, at 213.
154 See id. at 217.
155 See id. at 215.
156 See id. at 211.
157 Cf. JANET E. HALLEY, DON’T: A READER’S GUIDE TO THE MILITARY’S ANTI-GAY POLICY
(1999) (arguing that “don’t ask, don’t tell” empowered state actors to discriminate based on
status, while providing the illusion that they were reacting to conduct).
158 See Agan & Starr, supra note 53, at 31.
159 Id. at 33.
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employers might be more likely to assume that black applicants, rather
than white applicants, had criminal records; or (2) “benefits for white
applicants”—without information about criminal records, employers
simply might prefer white applicants, so that a white applicant with a
record might be more likely to get a job that a black applicant without
one. 160 While we do not know what actually accounts for Agan and
Starr’s findings, the proffered explanations for this phenomenon both
suggest that ban-the-box laws cannot be treated in a vacuum. The causes
speak not only to possible shortcomings in the legislation itself but also
to broader pathologies of race and class in the labor market and criminal
system. 161
None of these critiques is intended to diminish the positives of
ban-the-box or the very real possibility that it is the most politically
feasible option discussed in this Part. But, if we are concerned more
broadly with the relationship between private employers and the
criminal system, it is not clear that—as written—many of the ban-thebox policies provide a comprehensive, long-term solution to the
problem.
C.

An Employment Discrimination Model for Criminal Records

To the extent that ban-the-box does not go far enough, perhaps the
answer is a comprehensive anti-discrimination approach. Using Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 162 as a model, some scholars and
commentators have argued that the best means of addressing
discrimination against the formerly incarcerated is to treat it as
discrimination. 163 Under this framework, individuals with criminal
records might become a suspect class whose employment status would
not rise and fall entirely on the whim of their employers.164
Alternatively, some have argued that discrimination against those with
criminal records violates Title VII because of the disparate impact of
See id. at 34.
Indeed, some scholars and advocates have argued that the issues identified by Agan and
Starr are not problems with ban-the-box policies; rather the issues are signs of underlying racial
discrimination. See Maurice Emsellem & Beth Avery, Racial Profiling in Hiring: A Critique of
New “Ban the Box” Studies, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT (Aug. 11, 2016), http://www.nelp.org/
publication/racial-profiling-in-hiring-a-critique-of-new-ban-the-box-studies; Noah Zatz, Ban
the Box and Perverse Consequences, Part I, ONLABOR (Aug. 2, 2016), https://onlabor.org/2016/
08/02/ban-the-box-and-perverse-consequences-part-i.
162 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012).
163 See, e.g., RODRIGUEZ & EMSELLEM, supra note 50, at 19–21; Mukamal & Samuels, supra
note 41, at 1503; Mullings, supra note 20, at 264; Jocelyn Simonson, Rethinking “Rational
Discrimination” Against Ex-Offenders, 13 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 283, 287–88 (2006).
164 See, e.g., Aukerman, supra note 35, at 52–53; Geiger, supra note 74 (tracing this line of
argument). But see Schanuel v. Anderson, 546 F. Supp. 519, 524 (S.D. Ill. 1982).
160
161
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such discrimination on black and Latino job applicants. 165 The Supreme
Court has never directly addressed criminal record discrimination, 166
but we do have some guidance on how such litigation would proceed.
First, some states have adopted a discrimination-based approach.
New York, for example, prohibits employers from denying employment
“by reason of the [applicant’s] having been previously convicted of one
or more criminal offenses, or by reason of a finding of lack of ‘good
moral character’ when such finding is based upon the fact that the
individual has previously been convicted of one or more criminal
offenses . . . .” 167
Second, the federal government has weighed in on the potential
issues posed by employment discrimination against those with criminal
records. In 2012, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) weighed in on the place of criminal background checks in the
workplace, providing official guidance on the issue. 168 Addressing the
interplay between Title VII and the criminal legal system, the EEOC
noted the limitations of the current legal regime:
Having a criminal record is not listed as a protected basis in Title VII.
Therefore, whether a covered employer’s reliance on a criminal
record to deny employment violates Title VII depends on whether it
is part of a claim of employment discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. 169

That is, absent some other legal determination that individuals
with a criminal history are a suspect class, a discrimination analysis
would rest on the racial identity of those with criminal records.
Nevertheless, relying on statistical evidence of criminal law’s disparate
impact on people of color, 170 the EEOC has advised employers that
blanket criminal records exclusions can have a disparate impact based
on race or national origin, thus falling afoul of Title VII’s bar on
165 See, e.g., EEOC v. Freeman, 778 F.3d 463, 465 (4th Cir. 2015); Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 523
F.2d 1290, 1295–98 (8th Cir. 1975); Tammy R. Pettinato, Employment Discrimination Against
Ex-Offenders: The Promise and Limits of Title VII Disparate Impact Theory, 98 MARQ. L. REV.
831, 832–33 (2014).
166 See El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 479 F.3d 232, 240 (3d Cir. 2007). But see N.Y.C
Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (refusing to hire worker using methadone to
recover from addiction to illegal narcotics); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973) (refusing to hire worker who previously had participated in illegal protest against
employer).
167 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 752 (McKinney 2018); see also Leavitt, supra note 128, at 1294–98.
168 U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 915.002, EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE:
CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER
TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (Apr. 25, 2012) [hereinafter EEOC ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE], http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/upload/arrest_conviction.pdf.
169 Id. at 6.
170 See id. at 8–9; see also United States v. Valdovinos, 760 F.3d 322, 330–41 (4th Cir. 2014)
(Davis, J., dissenting) (collecting statistics); United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482 (6th Cir.
2013), vacated en banc, 746 F.3d 647 (6th Cir. 2013) (critiquing the racial impact of drug laws).
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discrimination. 171
However, the hiring practice’s disparate impact alone is not
sufficient to prove a Title VII violation. 172 Rather, a disparate impact
finding simply shifts the burden of persuasion to the employer to
demonstrate that “the challenged practice is job related for the position
in question and consistent with business necessity . . . .” 173 The exact
contours of the business necessity defense continue to confound courts
and commentators, 174 but the Third Circuit has addressed the
exception’s application to criminal-record-based discrimination. 175 In El
v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA), 176
Douglas El brought a Title VII claim against SEPTA after he was fired
from his job as a medical transportation worker because of his criminal
history. 177 Forty years earlier, when he was fifteen, El had been convicted
of second-degree murder. 178 SEPTA had hired El conditionally pending
a background check, but fired him immediately upon learning of the
conviction. 179 El, who was black, claimed that SEPTA’s blanket
prohibition on employing anyone with a “violent felony” conviction had
a racially disparate impact. 180 The Third Circuit rejected this argument,
concluding that SEPTA’s policy fell within the business necessity
exception because of the close contact between patients and employees
See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 168, at 8–10.
See id. at 10–11.
173 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012); see Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S.
642 (1989); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE,
supra note 168, at 10–11. But see El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 479 F.3d 232, 239 n.9 (3d
Cir. 2007) (“[T]he successful assertion of the business necessity defense is not an ironclad
shield; rather, the plaintiff can overcome it by showing that an alternative policy exists that
would serve the employer’s legitimate goals as well as the challenged policy with less of a
discriminatory effect.”).
174 See, e.g., SEPTA, 479 F.3d at 241; Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in
Disparate Impact Discrimination Cases, 30 GA. L. REV. 387, 391–93 (1996); Andrew C.
Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense to the Disparate Impact Cause of Action:
Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1479, 1520 (1996).
175 SEPTA, 479 F.3d at 241. In Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir.
1975), the Eighth Circuit also addressed a criminal record–based Title VII claim. In Green, the
employer refused to hire applicants with any criminal history beyond traffic infractions. Id. at
1292. While the court held that this policy was overbroad, the decision predated Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), and subsequent congressional clarification that
expanded the scope of the exception.
176 479 F.3d 232.
177 Id. at 235.
178 Id. at 235–36.
179 See id.
180 Id. at 235. Specifically, SEPTA would not hire anyone with a “record of driving under
[the] influence . . . of alcohol or drugs, and [a] record of any felony or misdemeanor conviction
for any crime of moral turpitude or of violence against any person(s),” or “any conviction
within the last seven (7) years for any other felony or any other misdemeanor in any category
referenced below (see section F.2.10.C) [listing specific offenses],” or who was “on probation or
parole for any such crime, no matter how long ago the conviction for such crime may be.” Id. at
235–236 (alterations in original).
171
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and the predictive value of past convictions. 181 The court noted that “it
is impossible to measure the risk perfectly,” but “Title VII does not ask
the impossible. It does, however, as in the case of performance-related
policies, require that the policy under review accurately distinguish
between applicants that pose an unacceptable level of risk and those that
do not.”182
Therefore, as with the other policy proposals, we are left with the
question of risk management and risk prediction. As a result, aside from
concerns about practicability due to judicial resistance to Title VII
suits, 183 an employment discrimination model raises two primary
issues—“rational discrimination”184 and worker privacy. First, courts
may well conclude that much discrimination against those with criminal
records is rational. In other words, the business necessity exception (or
analogous provisions under state law) might swallow the rule. Indeed, in
critiquing the concept of rational discrimination against people with
criminal records, Jocelyn Simonson has shown that this rationale largely
de-fanged New York’s statutory protections for job applicants with
criminal records. 185 This comes as no surprise, as the New York statute
contains a sweeping “business necessity” exception of its own:
employers can discriminate if
(1) there is a direct relationship between one or more of the previous
criminal offenses and the specific license or employment sought or
held by the individual; or (2) the issuance or continuation of the
license or the granting or continuation of the employment would
involve an unreasonable risk to property or to the safety or welfare of
specific individuals or the general public. 186

What is “unreasonable”? And, what constitutes a “direct
relationship”? In short, it is not a stretch to see how employers might
explain a great deal of discrimination in rational terms as calculated to
protect their own interests and those of consumers and other
employees.
Second, much like the strategy of curbing tort liability, this
employment-discrimination approach quickly raises employee privacy
concerns. It is unlikely that under a discrimination paradigm an
employer never could discriminate against a worker based on her
See id. at 246–47.
Id. at 244–45 (footnote omitted).
183 See Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1365
(2010) (“For as long as courts have recognized disparate impact claims under Title VII,
disparate impact suits have been notoriously difficult for plaintiffs to win . . . .”).
184 See generally JACOBS, supra note 1, at 277–78, 304; Simonson, supra note 163 (describing
and critiquing the ways in which rational discrimination applies to those with criminal
records).
185 See Simonson, supra note 163, at 286–87.
186 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 752 (McKinney 2018).
181
182
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criminal history. Judging from the statutory licensing schemes discussed
above as well as the carve-outs to ban-the-box laws, there is strong
public support for keeping some people with some criminal histories out
of some jobs. And, as in the tort context, determining whose criminal
history is sufficiently serious would require someone to assess criminal
history. Put simply, the same issues raised in the tort context apply
here 187: either (1) employers would be responsible for this screening,
putting them on notice of all an applicant’s past misconduct and
allowing them to determine what offense predicted future
dangerousness/offending; or (2) the state would have to provide some
prediction of future dangerousness. 188
D.

Contractual Solutions to the Problem of Conduct Policies

The background rules of tort law and employment discrimination
certainly might drive employers’ incentives to adopt employee conduct
policies. Regardless of whether there is a change in these background
rules, though, contract law might offer some assistance in reigning in
the policies themselves. That is, as discussed in Part II, employee
conduct policies are agreements between employers and (sometimes
unionized) workers. 189 Therefore, if we look to contract law here, we
might land on one of the contractual doctrines designed to restrict the
content or form of an agreement. 190 But it is hard to imagine judges
See supra Section III.A.
Finally, it is worth noting another problem with adopting an employment discrimination
paradigm: to the extent that we are concerned about marginalized or “disadvantaged” job
applicants, particularly people of color, focusing on people with criminal records seems like an
under-inclusive and imperfect approach. See JACOBS, supra note 1, at 300. That is, creating a
single carve-out to at-will employment would retain at-will employment for many others and
might not address the structural barriers to labor market entry that affect many without
criminal records. Or, as James Jacobs argues, such a system might ultimately benefit those with
criminal records at the expense of other job applicants from disadvantaged backgrounds. See id.
at 298–300. That being said, the criminal system already singles out those with criminal records
for certain services. Halfway houses, job training, and certain supervisory aspects of probation
are among the services that people with criminal records receive, while those without criminal
histories might not. The exclusivity of these benefits and services (i.e., that they are not
available to anyone, or at least anyone of limited means) is justified on the grounds of
facilitating reentry. See, e.g., Iacaboni v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1022–23 (D. Mass.
2003); S. David Mitchell, Impeding Reentry: Agency and Judicial Obstacles to Longer Halfway
House Placements, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 235, 239 (2011). That is, the state has marked
individuals as criminals, and, without some assistance, that mark will stay with them,
preventing them from re-socialization and increasing the likelihood of recidivism. See, e.g.,
Corey Rayburn Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws: Residency Restrictions on Sex
Offenders, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 101, 141 (2007). We might be skeptical about whether those
services should be viewed as “benefits” rather than extensions of punishment or vehicles of
social control. But, it is worth noting that they might be viewed or framed as benefits.
189 See supra Section II.B.
190 In unionized shops, we also might hope that unions would bargain around such
187
188
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broadly applying a set of doctrines (e.g., unconscionability) that tend to
be disfavored and that courts rarely embrace. 191
Perhaps these agreements could be void as against public
policy 192—a court might hold that the provisions of a conduct policy
that impose penalties on workers based on arrests, convictions, etc. fall
afoul of some broader public interest or policy. 193 An agreement might
be void for public policy agreements “if legislation provides that it is
unenforceable or the interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in
the circumstances by a public policy against the enforcement of such
terms.” 194 But what policy? The broader framework of criminal
employment law and the statutory network of collateral consequences
hardly speak to a preference for forgiveness. 195 Indeed, the broader web
of collateral consequences that accompany conviction suggests that the
legal regime we have is one in which ex-offenders generally cannot
escape their records and criminal conviction is treated as a reliable
predictor of future risk. 196
Returning to the morals clause analogy or to what Stephen
Sugarman calls “lifestyle discrimination,”197 it might be that courts
agreements or seek to modify their terms. That being said, given power dynamics in collective
bargaining and the range of other benefits that unions seek to maximize, employee conduct
agreements might remain a comparatively attractive concession (particularly when compared
with wages, benefits, etc.). See Marks, supra note 93 (describing the National Football League
Players Association’s treatment of the personnel conduct policy during collective bargaining).
191 See generally Hazel Glenn Beh, Curing the Infirmities of the Unconscionability Doctrine,
66 HASTINGS L.J. 1011 (2015) (examining the successes and failures of unconscionability
litigation).
192 Even under an expansive “safety net” conception of the unconscionability doctrine, see
Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. REV. 73, 74
(2006), it would be highly unlikely that a court would conclude that the sorts of provisions in
the employee conduct policies discussed above would be unconscionable.
193 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); cf. Juliet P.
Kostritsky, Illegal Contracts and Efficient Deterrence: A Study in Modern Contract Theory, 74
IOWA L. REV. 115, 117 n.5 (1988) (discussing the policies identified by courts); Percy H.
Winfield, Public Policy in the English Common Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 76, 76, 85–86 (1928)
(same).
194 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1).
195 See JACOBS, supra note 1, at 226 (“[T]he strong link between pervasive employment
discrimination and high recidivism rates is unsurprising, albeit extremely frustrating, in light of
statutorily sanctioned policies that seem specially designed to facilitate private sector bias
against convicted persons.”).
196 See, e.g., State v. Funk, 349 P.3d 1230, 1234 (Kan. 2015); Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd.,
764 A.2d 940, 972 (N.J. 2001), modified, 772 A.2d 926 (N.J. 2001) (“[R]esearch in the area of
risk assessment demonstrates that prior criminal history is probably the most important factor
in predicting future risk.”); Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk
Assessment, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 237, 237 (2015) (discussing the relationship between race and
criminal history as proxies for future dangerousness).
197 See generally Stephen D. Sugarman, “Lifestyle” Discrimination in Employment, 24
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 377 (2003). Sugarman defines lifestyle discrimination as decisions
made by employers to discipline or discharge workers for conduct away from work. See id. at
378–79.
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would be suspicious of agreements that sweep in too much conduct with
no apparent relationship to work or to the employer’s business. 198 To
the extent that courts view employment contracts as existing against a
backdrop of public preference for employee privacy, these concerns
might have some legal bite. Courts tend to grant employers great
latitude in restricting employee conduct, but that needn’t mean that
employer control is unlimited. 199 However, as discussed in the previous
Sections, employers might still provide compelling (or at least colorable)
claims of why conduct away from work does spill over into the
workplace or might have some nexus to employment. 200
E.

Employment Consequences at Sentencing

A common goal of the literature on collateral consequences is the
incorporation of collateral harms into the sentencing and plea
process. 201 As noted in the discussion of the ABA Standards, sentencing
plays a key role in proposed reforms. 202 There are two ways in which
collateral consequences could be integrated into the sentencing process:
(1) via notice by court or counsel; or (2) via integration into the
sentence itself.
1.

Notice of Consequences

First, scholars have argued that notice of collateral consequences is
essential and that defendants must know what fate awaits them after
they plead guilty. 203 The Standards explicitly endorse this notice
concern, recommending a requirement “that the defendant is fully
informed, before pleading guilty and at sentencing, of the collateral
sanctions applicable to the offense(s) charged . . . .”204 This concern and
the need for notice has taken on greater significance not simply because

See supra text accompanying notes 94–97.
See infra Part III (discussing and critiquing the expansive scope of employer control of
employee conduct outside of work).
200 See Sugarman, supra note 197, at 379.
201 See, e.g., Sandra G. Mayson, Collateral Consequences and the Preventive State, 91 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 301, 303 (2015); Kevin R. Reitz, The Economic Rehabilitation of Offenders:
Recommendations of the Model Penal Code (Second), 99 MINN. L. REV. 1735, 1754 (2015).
202 See A.B.A., supra note 4, at 2–3.
203 See, e.g., Jain, supra note 29, at 1210; Brian M. Murray, Beyond the Right to Counsel:
Increasing Notice of Collateral Consequences, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 1139, 1141–42 (2015); Michael
Pinard, The Logistical and Ethical Difficulties of Informing Juveniles About the Collateral
Consequences of Adjudications, 6 NEV. L.J. 1111 (2006); Pinard & Thompson, supra note 46, at
590–93; Roberts, supra note 5, at 677.
204 A.B.A., supra note 4, at 1.
198
199
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of the increasing number and severity of collateral consequences, 205 but
also because of the rise of plea bargaining. 206 In a criminal system where
a vanishingly small percentage of cases go to trial, 207 it is critical that
defendants know exactly what punishment they are agreeing to. From a
contractual perspective, how can a defendant knowingly agree to the
terms of a plea bargain if she does not fully understand the terms—that
the sentence she agrees to is not the end of her punishment and that her
criminal status carries with it other costs and consequences? 208
This concern has garnered significant attention in the context of
immigration-related collateral consequences. In Padilla v. Kentucky, 209
the Supreme Court took an unprecedented step towards recognizing the
importance of collateral consequences at sentencing and as a
component of plea deals. 210 The Court held that defendants have a Sixth
Amendment right to be informed of immigration consequences that
flow from a guilty plea. 211 The petitioner, Jose Padilla, a U.S. permanent
resident, had pleaded guilty to transporting marijuana and, as a result of
his conviction, was subject to deportation. 212 Padilla claimed that his
attorney’s failure to warn him of these immigration consequences prior
to the guilty plea amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel, and the
Court agreed. 213 Padilla sparked even more scholarly work on collateral
consequences, in hopes of expanding the Court’s rationale further and
requiring additional notice prior to a plea. 214
See supra text accompanying note 5.
See, e.g., Murray, supra note 203, at 1142; Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively Bliss:
Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L.
REV. 119 (2009).
207 See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010) (“Pleas account for nearly 95% of
all criminal convictions.”); GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA
BARGAINING IN AMERICA 9–10 (2003); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101
YALE L.J. 1979, 1986 (1992); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s
Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004).
208 See generally Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat
Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117 (2011) (describing a potential judicial
shift to regulating the terms of plea bargaining more carefully).
209 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
210 See, e.g., Chin & Love, supra note 20, at 21 (“There are only a handful of Supreme Court
decisions in the past 50 years that can be said to have transformed the operation of the criminal
justice system. Padilla v. Kentucky may be such a case.”); Logan, supra note 25, at 1104; Joanna
Rosenberg, Note, A Game Changer? The Impact of Padilla v. Kentucky on the Collateral
Consequences Rule and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1407,
1409–10 (2013). But cf. Darryl K. Brown, Why Padilla Doesn’t Matter (Much), 58 UCLA L. REV.
1393, 1395 (2011) (arguing that Padilla will have limited impact because it requires defense
attorneys to stay apprised of a vast web of collateral consequences).
211 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360.
212 Id. at 359.
213 See id. at 374–75.
214 See, e.g., JACOBS, supra note 1, at 248; Bibas, supra note 208, at 1146–51; Chin & Love,
supra note 20, at 21; Alice Clapman, Petty Offenses, Drastic Consequences: Toward a Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel for Noncitizen Defendants Facing Deportation, 33 CARDOZO L.
REV. 585 (2011); Steven Zeidman, Padilla v. Kentucky: Sound and Fury, or Transformative
205
206
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Unfortunately, a Padilla-style notice requirement probably would
be a bad fit for private employment consequences. That is not to say that
the logic is not compelling—unemployment may pale in comparison to
deportation, but both are dramatic, life altering circumstances that a
defendant and her family may face as a result of a conviction. Regardless
of whether they formally are “punishment,” they flow from conviction.
Yet, it is difficult to imagine what notice of employment consequences
would look like in practice—or how it would matter. Would a criminal
defense attorney be required to produce statistical evidence of employer
bias? 215 Would the sentencing court consider cost of living and compare
it to salaries from employers likely to hire ex-offenders?
In a sense, this issue represents an extension of a general problem
with Padilla’s implementation. Darryl Brown has argued that Padilla
actually will be of limited use to defendants because it places the onus of
learning and appreciating all collateral consequences on the defense
attorney. 216 For a defendant to understand fully the consequences of her
conviction, her attorney would need to grasp and be aware of a massive
range of statutes and state and federal schemes that would affect her
client post-conviction. 217 As noted above, the NICCC makes it easier to
scour state and federal codes to identify collateral consequences. 218 But
this remains a vast and shifting legal landscape. 219 And, given the crisis
in indigent defense, where attorneys are often under-funded and
overworked, 220 it is not at all clear that the defense attorney is the best
actor to address these issues. Even if Brown were overly pessimistic in
the context of statutory collateral sanctions, his point resonates strongly
when we consider informal collateral consequences. Communities are
home to different businesses with different hiring practices. Therefore,
the employment consequences that a defendant will face are contingent
upon the idiosyncratic and personal decisions of a range of private
actors. 221 And, while it would not be unreasonable to expect an attorney
(or the court) to offer general warnings about the challenges faced by
Impact, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 203 (2011).
215 But cf. supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing other legal areas that involve
predictive evidence about private employers and the ability to find work).
216 See Brown, supra note 210, at 1395.
217 See generally id.; Jain, supra note 29, at 1213.
218 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
219 See Brown, supra note 210, at 1395 (“The problem for defendants like Mr. Padilla who
face grave collateral consequences after conviction is the substantive criminal law and
sentencing law, the civil law regimes that create collateral consequences, and, at least in
immigration law, the limited procedural possibilities for avoiding or mitigating those
consequences.”).
220 See generally Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, a
National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031 (2006) (describing the funding obstacles to effective
representation of indigent defendants); Stephen B. Bright, Legal Representation for the Poor:
Can Society Afford This Much Injustice?, 75 MO. L. REV. 683 (2010) (same).
221 But see supra Part II (examining the structural forces that shape these decisions).
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individuals with criminal records, these warnings could not tell a
defendant with certainty what the world would look like for her postconviction.
Ultimately, regardless of how specific that advice were, it is not
clear how meaningful such advice would be or how far it could go in
addressing the core problems of criminal employment law. Assuming
that most defendants are aware of some general stigma associated with
criminal conviction, knowledge might not be the problem. Rather, the
problem is the stigma.
2.

Consequences as Punishment

Another means of approaching criminal employment law at
sentencing is to treat private employment consequences as punishment.
Many decisions about probation, parole, and conditions of release focus
on the granular or quotidian details of criminal defendants’ lives—
where a former offender can and cannot live; where she can and cannot
travel; with whom she can and cannot associate. 222 Employment
consequences are implicated by many of these restrictions and
decisions, but courts and probation departments generally do not
address them explicitly or on the record. That is, restrictions on where,
for whom, or in what industry a former offender may work, are a staple
of the modern criminal system and the carceral state. But they are
largely invisible. 223 Courts do not explicitly weigh these costs to
determine if they are proportional to a given offense or if a given
defendant is deserving of this added punishment.
A system that purports to value proportionality and individual
tailoring of punishment should be required to consider and internalize
collateral consequences. 224 As Jack Chin puts it, “[s]entencing is
222 See, e.g., United States v. Floyd, 491 F. App’x 331, 332 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing travel
restrictions); State v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1041 (Kan. 1996) (discussing housing and
employment restrictions); Tonja Jacobi et al., The Attrition of Rights Under Parole, 87 S. CAL. L.
REV. 887, 905–39 (2014) (cataloging restrictions imposed on parolees); Cecelia Klingele,
Rethinking the Use of Community Supervision, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1015 (2013)
(describing restrictions on liberty imposed as a part of community supervision).
223 See Travis, supra note 6, at 22.
224 See Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Constitutionally Tailoring Punishment,
112 MICH. L. REV. 397, 407 (2013). As a general matter, prior to sentencing, courts consider
sentencing memoranda or pre-sentencing reports. See, e.g., Stanton Wheeler, Adversarial
Biography: Reflections on the Sentencing of Michael Milken, 3 FED. SENT’G REP. 167, 169 (1990).
These memoranda often include biographical information intended to provide context and
influence the judge’s decision. See, e.g., United States v. Soto, 660 F.3d 1264, 1266 (10th Cir.
2011); United States v. Begay, 117 F. App’x 682, 684 (10th Cir. 2004). Further, at sentencing it is
not uncommon for judges to make statements about the defendant’s character or personal
background and explain how these characteristics affected the judge’s decision and the ultimate
sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Zuniga-Lazaro, 388 F.3d 308, 311 (7th Cir. 2004); United
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designed to impose punishment that is proportionate to the offense and
consistent with that imposed on similar offenders. These goals cannot
be achieved without evaluating the total package of sentencing facing an
individual.” 225 Again, the Standards identify this rationale and (at least
generally) a potential fix. 226 The Standards recommend that courts (and
perhaps legislators) “include collateral sanctions as a factor in
determining the appropriate sentence . . . .” 227
But, again, this solution appears to be a bad fit for private criminal
employment law consequences. While the literature on collateral
consequences tends to argue that the consequences constitute
punishment, 228 “collateral consequences are not, strictly speaking,
punishment,” 229 and courts have not embraced this expansive
conception of punishment. 230 To the extent that courts are unwilling to
treat a range of formal collateral consequences as punishment, it is
highly unlikely that they would be willing to treat these informal
collateral consequences as punishment.
Further, as discussed in the context of notice at sentencing, the
contingency of the employment consequences remains a sticking point.
While an attorney, judge, or probation department might predict the
challenges involved in finding or retaining employment post sentence,
these predictions will be probabilities, rather than certainties.
Additionally, as Pager and others have shown, the likelihood of
significant employment consequences may depend on a range of other
variables including the defendant’s race and education level, 231 as well as
the employment practices of businesses in the area.
States v. Dominguez, 296 F.3d 192, 195 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Sloane, 308 F.R.D. 85, 86
(E.D.N.Y. 2015); United States v. Norton, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1017 (E.D. Wis. 2002); cf. Laura
I. Appleman, Retributive Justice and Hidden Sentencing, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1307, 1308 (2007)
(examining “hidden (or ancillary) sentencing proceedings”).
225 Chin, The New Civil Death, supra note 8, at 1830.
226 See A.B.A., supra note 4, at 2.
227 Id. at 1, 18.
228 See, e.g., Alec C. Ewald, Collateral Consequences and the Perils of Categorical Ambiguity,
in LAW AS PUNISHMENT / LAW AS REGULATION 77, 93 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2011)
(“[C]ommentators from a variety of perspectives have concluded that collateral sanctions are a
legal burden constituting punishment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mayson, supra
note 201, at 314–17.
229 Chin, The New Civil Death, supra note 8, at 1811.
230 Generally speaking, scholars and courts have struggled to define criminal punishment
and—at the margins—to distinguish between civil and criminal punishments. See, e.g., Austin
v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621–22 (1993); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989),
abrogated by Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242,
251 (1980); Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and
Courts, 94 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (2005); Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment
Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 809–13 (1997).
231 See generally JACOBS, supra note 1, at 279–81 (reporting on studies that demonstrate that
black job applicants with criminal records are less likely to find employment than similarly
situated white applicants); PAGER, supra note 1 (same); Agan & Starr, supra note 53.
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In a sense, then, the reason that this proposal faces major
implementation obstacles or has glaring flaws is the very reason that
criminal employment law is so troubling: it is both certain and
uncertain. As a descriptive matter, we know that individuals with
criminal records face discrimination and adverse consequences in the
workplace. 232 And we know the laws and legal arrangements that
underpin this mistreatment. But we cannot be certain who ultimately
will make these decisions or how they will make them. The collateral
consequences themselves remain contingent. They are a critical
component of the criminal system as an extension of punishment. At
the same time, they remain external to the criminal system, shaped by
private actors and civil legal rules and regulations. The criminal
dimension is contingent on civil legal relations, and the public, punitive
force is contingent on private decision-makers.
Taking this issue of contingency as a frame, then, the next Part will
ask what criminal employment law can tell us about both the private
aspects of the criminal system and the public aspects of the employment
relationship.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF CRIMINAL EMPLOYMENT LAW
What is wrong with criminal employment law? The policy
proposals discussed in the Part III are important, but they are narrow
solutions for narrow problems. They treat collateral consequences in the
labor market as the product of narrow decisions and narrow doctrinal
problems, each in need of a fix. 233 Yet they fail to address the broader set
See supra text accompanying note 35.
It is worth noting that much of the legal (as opposed to sociological or criminological)
literature on employment consequences of conviction comes in the form of short student pieces
geared towards offering a proposed statute for a given state. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Gerlach,
Comment, The Background Check Balancing Act: Protecting Applicants with Criminal
Convictions While Encouraging Criminal Background Checks in Hiring, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 981, 1000 (2006); Mark Minuti, Note, Employer Liability Under the Doctrine of Negligent
Hiring: Suggested Methods for Avoiding the Hiring of Dangerous Employees, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L.
501, 523 (1988); Katherine A. Peebles, Note, Negligent Hiring and the Information Age: How
State Legislatures Can Save Employers from Inevitable Liability, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1397,
1419 (2012); Nancy B. Sasser, Comment, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”: Negligent Hiring Law in
Virginia and the Necessity of Legislation to Protect Ex-Convicts from Employment
Discrimination, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 1063, 1090 (2007); James R. Todd, Comment, “It’s Not My
Problem”: How Workplace Violence and Potential Employer Liability Lead to Employment
Discrimination of Ex-Convicts, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 725, 757 (2004). While these Notes and
Comments offer a range of important proposals, they also demonstrate the need for broader
more sustained treatment of criminal employment law and its place within the broader
framework of both employment law and criminal law. Cf. Mayson, supra note 201, at 309 (“We
may have reached a watershed moment for [collateral consequences] policy. On the other hand,
none of the recent [collateral consequences] policy developments are comprehensive, and most
are wholly aspirational.”).
232
233
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of legal relationships in which each decision or doctrine is imbedded.
Perhaps the most obvious lesson to be learned from an examination of
criminal employment law is the one reached by most scholars of
collateral consequences: punishment can be invisible, and if we want to
calibrate punishment properly or lessen its impact on individuals and
communities, we need to unmask invisible punishment. 234 While that is
an important lesson, it does not cut broadly enough. Certainly, revealing
hidden aspects of punishment is critical to addressing the problems of
mass incarceration, and I hope to contribute to the broader project
embodied by the ABA Standards, the NICCC, and the growing body of
legal and sociological literature on these costs. But, what the previous
Part emphasized was the way that—in the employment context—
something else is at work.
What is significant, troubling, and in need of reform in the
employment context is not only that employment consequences do not
appear at sentence. Criminal employment law is significant because it
also shows the ways in which criminal law has become private, the ways
in which private actors may become a part of the punitive apparatus,
extending the effects of punishment without formal checks. And, at the
same time, it shows us how employment is public, 235 how private
employers serve quasi-governmental functions as wielders of
disciplinary force and as gatekeepers to benefits, rights, and
opportunities. This Part will address the public/private distinction as it
applies to criminal employment law, focusing first on the private
dimensions of criminal law, before shifting to examine the public
dimensions of employment law (or, more precisely, the employment
relationship). 236 My claim is not that there is a clear or coherent line
234 See, e.g., Chin, The New Civil Death, supra note 8, at 1830; Pinard & Thompson, supra
note 46, at 590–93; Travis, supra note 6, at 15–17; Roberts, supra note 5, at 677.
235 As Martha Minnow has observed,

[d]efining what is “public” and what is “private” turns out to be complicated in part
due to the history of interconnections between governmental and private
initiatives. . . . In the United States, “public” has potentially three meanings: (1)
pertaining to the government, (2) pertaining to spaces and processes open to the
general population or “the people,” or (3) pertaining to any sphere outside the most
intimate, which usually means outside of the home and family.
Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1229, 1229 n.1 (2003).
236 Because doctrinal employment law encompasses not only aspects of tort and contract,
but also statutory provisions (e.g., Title VII, the Fair Labor Standards Act), it is uncontested
that there are public components of employment law. See, e.g., Arthur S. Leonard, A New
Common Law of Employment Termination, 66 N.C. L. REV. 631, 686 n.295 (1988); Lisa Rodgers,
Public Employment and Access to Justice in Employment Law, 43 INDUS. L.J. 373, 373 (2014)
(“In general terms, employment law sits uneasily on that public/private divide: although
founded on a ‘private’ contract of employment the regulation of that contract is steeped in
matters pertaining to the more general public interest.”); Naomi Schoenbaum, It’s Time That
You Know: The Shortcomings of Ignorance as Fairness in Employment Law and the Need for an
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between private and public. Rather, I hope to highlight the
inconsistency in a regime where employers subjugate workers’ rights to
the “public” interest, but where workers have limited legal recourse
against employers because they are “private” actors. 237 Criminal
employment law therefore shows that the public/private distinction is
not a line at all, but a semi-permeable membrane.
A.

Private Criminal Law

Outside of the collateral consequences frame, privatization and the
role of private actors in the criminal system increasingly have garnered
academic attention over the last few decades. In their treatments of
criminal law’s private dimensions, scholars have focused primarily on
private prisons, 238 with a lesser emphasis on private policing. 239 To many
critics of these institutions, privatization of punitive functions
represents a victory of neoliberal governance principles—the state
purports to retain a monopoly on violence, but it does so by
commodifying and marketizing state violence (in the form of private
prison and policing contracts). 240 Law enforcement and incarceration,
like other government functions, have become the province of marketbased thinking and market-primacy. Viewed through this lens, the turn
to private actors in the criminal legal system represents an embrace of
an “economistic” view of state services that prioritizes cost and
efficiency over values of rehabilitation, socialization, or even
retribution. 241 Further, by allowing private market actors into the
management of the criminal system, policy makers have created a
“Information-Shifting” Model, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 99, 150 (2007). My claim in this Article
and in this Part, however, is that the employment relationship in and of itself may be public
because of the public functions assigned to private employers. See supra Section IV.B.
237 See James Atleson, Confronting Judicial Values: Rewriting the Law of Work in a Common
Law System, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 435, 443 (1997); Karl E. Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in
Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358, 1362 (1982).
238 See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 441
(2005); Richard Harding, Private Prisons, 28 CRIME & JUST. 265, 265 (2001); Benjamin Levin,
Inmates for Rent, Sovereignty for Sale: The Global Prison Market, 23 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 509,
549 (2014); Ira P. Robbins, Privatization of Corrections: Defining the Issues, 40 VAND. L. REV.
813 (1987); Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and
Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879, 902 (2004).
239 See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
49 (2004); Rosky, supra note 238, at 896–99; David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L.
REV. 1165, 1166–68, 1199 (1999).
240 See, e.g., BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND
THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER 233–39 (2011); Rosky, supra note 238, at 880.
241 See Dolovich, supra note 238, at 544; cf. Richard Michael Fischl, “Running the
Government Like a Business”: Wisconsin and the Assault on Workplace Democracy, 121 YALE
L.J. ONLINE 39, 39–41 (2011) (critiquing the move to focus on efficiency in government
operations at the expense of other values).
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pernicious dynamic: private prison contractors and other stakeholders
lack incentives to reduce prison populations; instead, these private
actors benefit from large prison populations and punitive criminal laws
that ensure a continuing need for the “prison industrial complex.” 242
Beyond the political economy critique, scholars have also
emphasized the ways in which private actors complicate and even
undermine the purposes of punishment. 243 For example, in addressing
prison privatization through a retributive lens, Mary Sigler argues that
“[p]unishment is . . . meaningful not primarily as a means to an end;
rather, punishment instantiates justice. The delegation of punishment
through prison privatization attenuates the meaning of punishment in a
liberal state and undermines the institution of criminal justice.”244 That
is, to the extent that criminal law is meant to embody some sort of
collective consciousness or shared moral opprobrium, 245 a system that
employs private actors or that implicates private motives may fail to
advance the public interest. Private actors have private incentives and
concerns—concerns that they might share with other members of the
society, but that need not be embodied formally in criminal law or in the
official policies that shape the criminal system. 246 In short, what is
troubling about private actors in the criminal system is not only their
incentives and their status within a market economy; it is their
legitimacy. We lack a clear justification for why they (rather than the
state, or other private actors) are entitled to exercise force and discipline
over other members of the polity. If criminal law is—at least in part—
rooted in socialization (or social control), then how can actors without
the imprimatur of the state or the stamp of democratic legitimacy
perform the rituals of punishment and/or formal societal
condemnation?
242 For discussions on the prison industrial complex, see Gabriel Arkles, Correcting Race and
Gender: Prison Regulation of Social Hierarchy Through Dress, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 859, 865 n.26
(2012); Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, From Private Violence to Mass Incarceration: Thinking
Intersectionally About Women, Race, and Social Control, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1418, 1420 n.1
(2012); cf. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505
(2001) (describing the political and economic forces that drive support for harsh criminal
policies).
243 See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 238, at 543–44; Levin, supra note 238, at 549; Mary Sigler,
Private Prisons, Public Functions, and the Meaning of Punishment, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 149,
151 (2010).
244 Sigler, supra note 243, at 151.
245 See, e.g., ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 58 (George Simpson
trans., 1964); DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL
THEORY 67–68 (1990).
246 As noted above, employers could have a range of reasons to treat individuals with
criminal records differently from other applicants or employees. See supra Part II. They
certainly could be motivated by a desire to express moral condemnation, but they also could be
focused on maximizing profits, attracting more costumers, or protecting consumers or other
employees.
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Given the general lack of engagement with private decision-makers
in the collateral consequences literature, it is not surprising that this
public/private debate has gone largely unexplored. In looking at
criminal employment law as a species of “informal” collateral
consequences, however, the problems of private actors become
increasing salient. Of course, a vast network of statutory criminal
employment law exists that does not implicate private actors, or, at least,
that does not implicate the discretion of private actors. 247 But, the
corners of criminal employment law described in this Article—the tort
doctrines and the employee conduct policies—rest on the decisions of
private employers. That is, the statutory frameworks, coupled with the
tort doctrines create a labor market in which private employers are
tasked with and/or empowered to continue to discipline workers based
on the past or on parallel proceedings of the criminal system.
Certainly, private employers in this narrative occupy a different
position from private prison companies, private security firms, and the
other actors critiqued by scholars of criminal law’s turn to privatization.
Prison contractors have powerful incentives to support the carceral
state, 248 but it is unclear that employers do. An employer’s decision not
to employ an ex-offender may be rooted in a calculus of efficiency,
trustworthiness, or risk aversion, 249 but there is no reason to assume that
employers benefit directly from the legal regime that discourages hiring
people with criminal records or that employers have some stake in
preserving it. 250
Yet, to the extent we find compelling the privatization critiques in
other corners of the criminal legal system, I think that those critiques
should be a source of concern here as well. 251 In one of the only articles
to treat employer discipline through the lens of punishment theory,
Janine Kim and Matthew Parlow argued that some types of employer
discipline (specifically, in the sports context) resemble private
policing. 252 Adopting an expressivist approach, Kim and Parlow suggest
See supra text accompanying notes 41–48.
See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 238, at 474–80; Sigler, supra note 243, at 151.
249 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
250 Indeed, as discussed below in Section IV.B., there may be reason to think that the way in
which the effective deputization of employers described in this Article may be more of a burden
than a boon.
251 It is worth noting that criminal law, despite its status as “public” law has long had
“private” components or served private ends. See Benjamin Levin, American Gangsters: Rico,
Criminal Syndicates, and Conspiracy Law as Market Control, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105,
118 (2013). Indeed, private prisons may not be that far removed from earlier moments of
incarceration that relied on convict leasing and other public/private prison labor regimes. See
Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 626 (2000); cf.
Gary Peller, Public Imperialism and Private Resistance: Progressive Possibilities of the New
Private Law, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1001, 1005 (1996) (arguing that ostensibly “public” areas
historically have not represented the public or have had private dimensions).
252 See Kim & Parlow, supra note 15, at 590; cf. Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in
247
248
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that the disciplining of workers by professional sports leagues, via
employee conduct policies, may send the same sort of public signals that
are traditionally associated with criminal punishment. 253 In their
account, this “punishment” need not supplant state action or formal
prosecution in order to implicate considerations of proportionality and
public morality. 254 That is, the NFL personnel conduct policy—and
similar provisions—significantly extend the logic and effects of criminal
punishment. 255
In some sense, then, criminal employment law, much like the other
turns to private actors, fundamentally alters the institutions and
operations of the criminal system. The monopoly on state violence that
has been used historically to justify criminal law and criminal
punishment is (or at least purportedly is) checked by constitutional
rights and private causes of action. 256 The rules of criminal procedure,
the Bill of Rights, and the causes of action under state and federal civil
rights statutes create a framework under which state action remains
bounded. On the one hand, punitive force is justified by the language of
democratic theory and political legitimacy. 257 On the other, punitive
force and the power of the state to discipline have their limitations,
restrictions that nominally grant individuals some protection from
official overreach or a criminal system run amok. Put simply, the state
action both empowers (via the monopoly on violence) and constrains
(via constitutional checks).
Unlike traditional criminal law, criminal employment law is
neither fish nor fowl. It is not state action, at least not as most lawyers,
scholars, and courts understand it. 258 While the Supreme Court has held
FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 48, 48 (Leo Katz et al. eds., 1999) (arguing that punishment
occurs whenever “persons who possess authority impose designedly unpleasant consequences
upon, and express their condemnation of, other persons who are capable of choice and who
have breached established standards of behavior”); Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92
B.U. L. REV. 577, 580 (2012) (defining punishment in terms of public morality).
253 See Kim & Parlow, supra note 15, at 590. As discussed at length above, Kim and Parlow
emphasize that special properties of professional sports (notably, the culture of publicity and
media attention surrounding the industry) might make this insight particularly applicable in
that context. See sources cited supra note 102.
254 See Kim & Parlow, supra note 15, at 590–97.
255 My claim here is not that such policies and employer discipline satisfy the formal
definition of punishment; rather, my claim is that employer decision-making extends the effects
of punishment, thus implicating employers in the criminal system’s punitive apparatus.
256 See, e.g., Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 253 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), modified, 294
F. Supp. 2d 369 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (“It is a long held maxim that the state holds a monopoly on
violence . . . .”); Susan Dimock, Criminalizing Dangerousness: How to Preventively Detain
Dangerous Offenders, 9 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 537, 552 (2015); Austin Sarat, Violence, Representation,
and Responsibility in Capital Trials: The View from the Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 1103, 1134 (1995).
257 See Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
307, 312–13 (2004).
258 Cf. Ira P. Robbins, The Legal Dimensions of Private Incarceration, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 531,
577–604 (1989) (describing the challenges posed by attempting to apply the state action
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that “[s]tate action . . . refers to exertions of state power in all forms,” 259
the state action doctrine remains dreadfully muddled, a constant source
of irritation for both courts and scholars. 260 Therefore, in contexts like
criminal employment law, where governmental involvement in the
ultimate conduct by employers is attenuated at best, it is unlikely that
constitutional criminal procedure principles would be applied to private
employers. As a result, while private employers lack some of the powers
and responsibilities of the state (to incarcerate, to use force, etc.), they
also lack the institutional checks on state action. To the extent that the
state retains the moral authority and political legitimacy to punish, it
need not follow that private employers also do. And, more practically,
when the state gets it wrong—i.e., punishes an innocent defendant,
commits unjustified violence—Bivens, 261 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 262 and other
legal mechanisms exist to correct, or at least address, the error. When
private actors err, it is much harder for the wronged party to seek
recourse successfully. 263 In George v. Pacific-CSC Work Furlough, for
example, the Ninth Circuit rejected a claim that a private prison
contracting company was a state actor when it came to claims regarding
how it treated prison employees. 264 Similarly, in Holly v. Scott, the
Fourth Circuit reached the same result in rejecting a constitutional
claim against correctional officers employed by a private prison
company. 265
From a practical standpoint, therefore, the “private” nature of
criminal employment law makes it difficult to devise a legal solution.
The policy proposals discussed above each hit a wall when we consider
that the effects for ex-offenders rely on private decision-makers. That is,
criminal employment law remains distinct from the “formal” collateral
doctrine to private prison officials).
259 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
260 See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protection, and California’s
Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967); Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80
NW. U. L. REV. 503, 503–04 (1985) (“There still are no clear principles for determining whether
state action exists.”); Gary Peller & Mark Tushnet, State Action and a New Birth of Freedom, 92
GEO. L.J. 779, 817 (2004); Sklansky, supra note 239, at 1229–80.
261 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (allowing for private
rights of action based on deprivation of rights by federal actors).
262 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (allowing for a private right of action based on deprivation of
rights by state actors).
263 See, e.g., Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89
CALIF. L. REV. 569, 631 (2001). But see Rosborough v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., 350 F.3d 459,
461 (5th Cir. 2003) (treating private prison contractors as state actors for section 1983
purposes). For a discussion on the challenges of applying the state action doctrine to private
actors in the criminal system, see Sklansky, supra note 239, at 1229–80.
264 George v. Pac.-CSC Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir. 1996).
265 Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d 287, 292 (4th Cir. 2006); see also King v. Hilgert, No.
4:13CV3061, 2015 WL 1119451, at *5 (D. Neb. Mar. 11, 2015) (finding that private prison
employee was not a state actor); Shapiro v. Cmty. First Servs., Inc., No. 11-CV-4061
(KAM)(LB), 2014 WL 1276479, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2014) (same).
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consequences addressed in the Standards because it is contingent on the
decisions of private actors who lack any official relationship to the
criminal legal system. 266 Outside of the limited Title VII examples
discussed above, 267 “public law” generally does not recognize criminal
employment law or acknowledge these consequences as a part of the
criminal law universe. In a sense, then, criminal employment law
reproduces the problems of privatization in other areas of the criminal
system and illustrates the ways in which private prisons and other
targets of critique are not unique. The justice system is a massive
apparatus, a network of institutions, laws, and legal actors that extends
well beyond police, courts, and prisons. And that means that the
problems with the criminal system—its social and economic costs, its
racially disparate impact, etc.—implicate actors who are not formal state
actors and who are not formal officers of the criminal system.
William Stuntz famously argued that the expansiveness and
punitive nature of the criminal law were the products of a particular
political economy. 268 Stuntz claimed that the electoral incentives of
prosecutors, legislators, and judges combined to make criminal law a
one-way ratchet, yielding a larger and harsher criminal system. 269 These
“pathological politics” had driven an explosion in prison populations
and a criminal system that had grown to an unprecedented size. 270 What
is remarkable when we consider criminal employment law, though, are
the ways in which criminal law’s pathological politics and troubled
incentives bleed out of the elected branches, and even out of the formal
confines of the criminal system. To appreciate the current state of the
criminal system requires stepping outside of the scope of Stuntz’s frame
and recognizing that the private market and private market actors
continue to replicate and re-inscribe the harms of the criminal law. The
issue is less that private actors are necessarily worse for criminal
defendants, for justice, or for the operation of the criminal system.
Rather, it’s that if these private actors play an important role in the
functioning of the criminal system, they should be treated accordingly.

See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
See supra Section III.C.
268 See generally Stuntz, supra note 242.
269 See id. at 528–65.
270 See id. This is not to say that the criminal system of earlier moments was not beset by its
own pathologies and deep-seated structural flaws. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Book Review,
Criminal Justice, Local Democracy, and Constitutional Rights, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1086–87
(2013).
266
267
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Public Employment Law

Much as the criminal law has metastasized, so too has the role and
function of employers as purveyors of social services and as the vehicle
by which social and economic policy is implemented. In this respect,
criminal employment law is also transforming the employment
relationship and the limits of employee privacy. Writing in 1991, Vivian
Berger, then-General Counsel to the American Civil Liberties Union,
predicted a future in which the greatest threats to civil liberties might
come not only from the state, but also from private actors:
Above all, business organizations have come to assume a hegemony
over their workers’ lives rivaling that of the national government at
the time the Bill of Rights was adopted. Technology has greatly
enhanced this power: many companies routinely monitor employee
phone calls and other activities by means of electronic devices or
require intrusive polygraph tests before or during the course of
employment. Increasingly, too, in order to reduce . . . costs or for
other self-interested reasons, employers are attempting to control the
personal lives of workers. 271

Criminal employment law is a powerful indicator that such a future
already has arrived. 272
Employment law and the employment relationship have long
occupied a peculiar place at the boundaries of public and private. 273 And
the contours of the distinction have long been manipulated to justify
varying degrees of judicial intervention in employment contracting.274
Prior to the New Deal moment, courts and legislators treated
employment as the product of a private relationship between employer
and employee. 275 This approach meant that courts and legislators viewed
the enforcement of contracts as their province, but shied away from or
Vivian Berger, Civil Liberties in the Next Century, 63 N.Y. ST. B.J. 46, 48 (1991).
Indeed, other scholars, writing long before Berger, had already warned that the power of
private employers had become a danger for employees. See, e.g., David L. Bazelon, Civil
Liberties—Protecting Old Values in the New Century, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 505, 512–13 (1976);
Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1404 (1967) (“It is a widely accepted
proposition that large corporations now pose a threat to individual freedom comparable to that
which would be posed if governmental power were unchecked. The proposition need not,
however, be limited to the mammoth business corporation, for the freedom of the individual is
threatened whenever he becomes dependent upon a private entity possessing greater power
than himself. Foremost among the relationships of which this generality is true is that of
employer and employee.” (footnotes omitted)).
273 See supra note 236.
274 See Klare, supra note 237, at 1361–62.
275 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81
Tenn. 507, 518–19 (Tenn. 1884), overruled in part by Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134, 138
(Tenn. 1915); Joseph R. Grodin, Constitutional Values in the Private Sector Workplace, 13
INDUS. REL. L.J. 1, 4–6 (1992).
271
272
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outwardly disclaimed the public or social implications of private
orderings. 276 Employment was regarded as a “dominant-servient
relation rather than one of mutual rights and obligations.” 277 Under
such a conception of employment, “[t]he employer, as owner of the
enterprise, is viewed as owning the job with a property right to control
the job and the worker who fills it. . . . The employer is sovereign over
his or her employee subjects.” 278 There was no place for public
considerations or for a treatment of the contract as embedded in or
shaping the social, economic, and political conditions of the public
sphere. 279
The New Deal moment saw a reimagining of the employment
relationship. To the new school of legal realist scholars, all law was
public. 280 Contracting parties negotiated against a set of background
rules—distributions of power and property created by political
decisions, rather than a natural, “free” market. 281 Where courts had
previously struck down employment regulations as impinging on the
constitutional right to freedom of contract, 282 the Court began to adopt
more of a realist approach and shifted away from the clean, formalist
public/private distinction in regulating the workplace. 283 The New Deal
era saw the passage of statutes that regulated the terms and conditions
of employment, and ensuing decades have seen a range of such statutes
erode further at-will employment and the Lochner-era conception of
employment as private. 284 But, aspects of the earlier conception of
employment remain: employers can generally fire employees without
cause, 285 and, as the discussion in Part II highlighted, courts and
276 See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT
(1998) (describing the pre-New Deal legal ordering that relied on clear distinctions between
public and private and that prioritized property rights).
277 Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of
Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 78 (2000).
278 Id.; see also CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 390 (1993).
279 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 10–11 (1992).
280 See Gary Peller, The Classical Theory of Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 300, 304–05 (1988).
281 See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 8–13 (1928);
Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q.
470, 474–75 (1923).
282 See, e.g., Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (invalidating
minimum wage law); Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 553 (1923) (same); Coppage v.
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1914).
283 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel, 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937); Laura Kalman, Law, Politics, and the New Deal(s), 108 YALE L.J.
2165, 2172 (1999).
284 See generally Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A
Historical Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351 (2002) (chronicling the
development of employment law).
285 See Jack M. Beermann & Joseph William Singer, Baseline Questions in Legal Reasoning:
The Example of Property in Jobs, 23 GA. L. REV. 911, 917–19 (1989).
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legislatures still defer to the preferences and business interests of
employers. 286 That is, if the categories retain any descriptive or
theoretical value, employment law is at once private and public.
This is an oversimplified account of employment law’s
development and the shift away from a purely private conception of
employment law. But this history is important to understanding the
significance of criminal employment law’s place in the current
public/private model. Criminal employment law is both public and
private in two ways: (1) it is subject to statutory regulation, but it is also
the province of private agreements; and (2) it is premised on the belief
that employers should (or, at least, can) serve the public interest, but it
also depends on a view of employment where employers are allowed to
prioritize their own private business interests. The first public/private
point is simply a restatement of the realist claim about the public/private
distinction and is true of most areas of the law. 287 Therefore, it does not
require further discussion. But the second represents a new approach to
employment regulation—an approach that criminal employment law
exemplifies.
A central claim of this Article is that criminal employment law
makes employers complicit in certain aspects of the criminal system.
That is, the tort doctrines, combined with the statutory licensing
schemes and public consumer support for employer discipline of
workers, has led to a system in which employers effectively serve a
public function. By situating this “private punishment” within a broader
frame of privatization literature, 288 I hope to emphasize the ways in
which the ends of criminal employment law map onto the aims of
criminal punishment. In carrying out these ends, though, employers
may well engage in a range of practices that vitiate worker privacy (e.g.,
email searches, GPS tracking, exhaustive background checking, and
extensive limitations on conduct away from work). 289 And, while publicsector employees enjoy some Fourth and First Amendment
protections, 290 private-sector employees do not and have limited
recourse at common law. 291 To the extent that employee conduct
policies reach conduct away from work, employers may exercise an
almost unlimited jurisdiction to impose the moral force of criminal (or
See supra Section II.B; see also Atleson, supra note 237, at 443.
See HORWITZ, supra note 279, at 1426–27.
288 See generally supra Section III.A.
289 See, e.g., JACOBS, supra note 1, at 306–08; S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Revisiting the
Public/Private Distinction: Employee Monitoring in the Workplace, 32 GA. L. REV. 825, 829
(1998); cf. Paul M. Secunda, Privatizing Workplace Privacy, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 277, 280
(2012) (noting similar trends in practices among government employers).
290 See, e.g., City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 765 (2010); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S.
709 (1987). See generally Secunda, supra note 289.
291 See Wilborn, supra note 289, at 829.
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quasi-criminal) law. 292
Therefore, employers take on public responsibility that justifies
intrusions into worker privacy and exacerbates the imbalance of
workplace power relations. At the same time, employers remain private,
unchecked by the Constitution, and shielded from liability by judicial
deference to the same private values of workplace efficiency and
business-owner autonomy that justified the pre-realist freedom of
contract cases. 293 To the extent that we are uncomfortable with the idea
of private employers being treated as state actors, unshielded by their
private status, it is worth asking why. And, if it wouldn’t make sense to
treat private employers as state actors for liability purposes, then why
does it make sense to allow them to take on state functions?
Richard Epstein has argued in favor of employment at will as more
protective of individual rights. 294 By this logic, the real concern for
workers should be the state; a legal system that makes it easier to get in
and out of contractual relationships is one that maximizes the power of
private actors, and therefore maximizes liberty. 295 Without rehashing
the realist/formalist debates of the 1930s, 296 I think it is important to
emphasize the ways in which criminal employment law undermines
Epstein’s argument. If the concern is state power, then what happens
when it becomes harder to distinguish between the private and the
public, the employer and the state? That is, even if we were prepared to
accept Epstein’s dismissal of realist concerns for background rules, his
argument appears to be premised on a belief that employers and
employees are seeking to maximize profits or efficiency, not that they
are seeking to enforce broader conceptions of morality. To the extent
that employers are acting to advance quasi-public punitive goals, then
why should we be less concerned by these private actors than by the
state? Or, even if we accept that state punishment is more severe than
private punishment so that we should be more concerned, why does it
follow that we shouldn’t still worry about the disciplining power of
employers?
When considering employer power and employers’ function within
the system of criminal employment law, it is worth considering the costs
292 Cf. Noah D. Zatz, A New Peonage?: Pay, Work, or Go to Jail in Contemporary Child
Support Enforcement and Beyond, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 927, 929 (2016) (“These coercive labor
practices are redolent of peonage, one component of the Jim Crow South’s broader system of
racial labor control, which leveraged a racist criminal justice system into an institution of labor
subordination. That system, too, often flew the banner of disciplining the dissolute laborer and
containing his threat to social order.”).
293 See supra text accompanying notes 276–79, 282.
294 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947,
954–55 (1984).
295 See, e.g., Garcia v. Kankakee Cty. Hous. Auth., 279 F.3d 532, 536 (7th Cir. 2002); R.S. &
V. Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 917 F.2d 348, 352 (7th Cir. 1990).
296 See supra text accompanying notes 275–84.
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to employers as well as employees that such a regime creates. Whether
criminal employment law empowers employers or burdens them is not
entirely clear. Certainly, as discussed in the context of conduct policies,
some criminal employment law institutions (and some public calls to
action) empower employers and grant them even more authority over
workers. But, as discussed above, tort doctrines impose clear burdens on
employers and expose them to liability if they fail to take account of
criminal histories. 297 Similarly, the range of occupational licensing
statutes and regulations restrict who an employer may hire. 298 And, as
noted in the context of employee conduct policies, consumers and
clients often hold employers responsible for the conduct of their
employees, even conduct with little to no relationship to work or the
workplace. 299 Combine these burdens with some of the reform proposals
discussed earlier, and it is easy to see how employers are often left
between a rock and a hard place. Hiring or retaining those with criminal
records may, in some cases, trigger civil suits or state regulatory action,
while, in other cases, refraining from doing so might prompt EEOC
action. Put simply, the disparate and internally inconsistent web of
criminal employment law may well whipsaw employers, 300 forcing them
to choose a least-worst option when presented with possible sources of
liability. 301
Ultimately, though, intention need not be an essential component
of our analysis. If we are concerned with effects (as most collateral
consequences literature is), 302 then what matters most is the impact that
the decisions have, not the motivations that drive the decisions. That is,
employers might be acting wholly rationally or their motives and
preferences might be sympathetic. But, if the problem with criminal
employment law is that it has shifted decision-making to unaccountable
actors and has extended the scope of punishment, then it should matter
See generally supra Section I.A.
See supra text accompanying notes 41–45.
299 See supra text accompanying notes 96–97.
300 Thanks to Jack Chin for offering this phrasing and insight.
301 See, e.g., Gerlach, supra note 9, at 982–83; Leavitt, supra note 128, at 1283; Mullings,
supra note 20, at 274–75. That said, it is possible that criminal employment law harms or
burdens employers in a less sympathetic way: it makes it more difficult to hire workers who
have less bargaining power and might be less likely to assert their legal rights or challenge
employers’ authority. That is, aside from altruism or a belief in second chances, it is conceivable
that an employer might believe that workers with criminal records will make more cooperative
or compliant workers. They have more to lose or might be less likely to rock the boat by
challenging employers’ policies, complaining about supervisors, etc. because they might
understand how difficult it would be to find another job. Cf. ZATZ ET AL., supra note 11
(discussing the significant power advantages employers have over workers on probation,
parole, or supervised release).
302 See, e.g., Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Modern Day Scarlet Letter, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2999,
3004–05 (2015); Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1383,
1396 (2002); Pinard & Thompson, supra note 46, at 593–604.
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relatively little whether those unaccountable actors are right or wrong
when they make decisions.
In this respect, employer intent might be a red herring that
distracts from the risks posed and harms done by criminal employment
law. Attempting to show animus (or lack thereof) removes focus from
the effects of the doctrines and institutions described in this Article. As I
noted at the outset, one goal of this Article is to begin to understand why
criminal employment law exists—i.e., what incentives and ideologies
shape employer decisions and legal rules. But focusing too much on
individual employers as good or bad actors obscures the broader
structural forces that shape their decisions. Indeed, one of the problems
with a number of the narrow fixes discussed in Part III is that they are
responsive to individual acts or individual actors, rather than the
underlying structures of inequality that define both the criminal legal
system and the labor market. 303
In calling for broader structural solutions to the problems of
workplace inequality, Samuel Bagenstos has argued that “[w]e have
reached, or will soon reach, the limits of what our current conception of
employment discrimination law can do to solve the persistent problems
of workplace inequity.” 304 That is, “[m]any of today’s most significant
problems are structural and are widely understood to lie beyond the
responsibility of individual employers.” 305 Regardless of whether
Bagenstos is right about the effectiveness of Title VII suits as a form of
impact litigation, 306 his underlying insight resonates here. Each
employer is only one component of a broader social, economic, and
political system. The problems of criminal employment law are broader
structural problems that implicate the inequality of bargaining power
and the social and economic conditions of those with criminal
records. 307
Criminal employment law tells us about more than the lack of
303 Cf. Noah Zatz, Ban the Box and Perverse Consequences, Part III, ONLABOR (Aug. 4,
2016), https://onlabor.org/2016/08/04/ban-the-box-and-perverse-consequences-part-iii/#more16105 (emphasizing “the cumulative effects” of individual hiring decisions and individual
instances of discrimination).
304 Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 47 (2006).
305 Id.
306 Bagenstos is not alone in lamenting the limitations of employment law. See Jeffrey D.
Jones, The Public’s Interest in “Private” Employment Relations, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 657,
657–58 (2012) (“Few employment law scholars are satisfied with the current state of
employment law. . . . Professor Bagenstos speaks for many of us . . . .”).
307 Cf. Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1528 (1983) (critiquing family law reforms as taking too narrow a view of
the problems of gender hierarchy in the market at large); Ahmed A. White, My Coworker, My
Enemy: Solidarity, Workplace Control, and the Class Politics of Title VII, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 1061
(2015) (critiquing employment discrimination law as insufficient to address broader class and
power dynamics in the workplace).
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employee privacy and the lack of a clear line between public and private.
It illustrates the power imbalance of the modern workplace. In
examining the rise of employer email monitoring, Rosa Ehrenreich
Brooks describes the problem as “a power issue that stems both from the
deep structure of American employment law and from the economic
and social framework of our society more broadly.” 308 Because a fired
worker will suffer “some tangible and extremely unpleasant economic
harms,” 309 any doctrine or legal institution that allows employers to
monitor or discharge furthers the liminality of a vulnerable or marginal
worker. In Brooks’s frame, each policy
is only a symptom. The problem is that despite the erosion of atwill employer traditional privileges, most American workers have
very little power in relation to their employers. Most can be fired
for an astonishingly large number of reasons and can have an
awful lot of their rights infringed upon with impunity. The
solution to this problem is not the creation of laws or policies
forbidding e-mail monitoring by employers, although that would
be helpful as a first step. The solution would involve a radical
overhaul of employment law. 310

This Article does not purport to offer a vision for what such an
overhaul would entail. But Brooks’s insight is critical to understanding
what is wrong with criminal employment law. Entrusting private
employers with enforcing criminal law has costs for the criminal system,
but it also has costs for individual workers who face a system of almostunchecked employer discipline—a system in which unaccountable
actors are tasked with weeding out the good from the bad and imposing
their own brand of punishment.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that criminal employment law is
transforming the nature of the employment relationship and the
delivery of criminal punishment. This hybrid public/private and
civil/criminal institution exacerbates both the punitive turn in criminal
law and the marginalization of those with criminal records. Like many
questions of criminal justice reform, the best policy solution is not
immediately apparent. As I have shown, there are a range of possible
solutions already on the table, but each of them has its weaknesses—
weaknesses that show how and why criminal employment law is
becoming an intractable problem in the U.S. labor market.
308
309
310

Rosa Ehrenreich, Privacy and Power, 89 GEO. L.J. 2047, 2054 (2001).
Id.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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“We have become a nation of employees,” observed sociologist
Frank Tannenbaum in 1951. 311 Because of the reliance on wages and the
relationship between employment and social and economic benefits,
“the substance of life is in another man’s hands.” 312 Criminal
employment law shows us the costs of a continued reliance on such a
model not only for delivering benefits, but also for imposing
punishment.
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